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Summary 
How and to what degree is the World Bank putting its new institutional citizen engagement 
(CE) commitments into practice? This question guides an independent assessment that the 
Accountability Research Center (ARC) at American University has undertaken as part of the 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS)-led Action for Empowerment and Accountability 
(A4EA) research programme’s investigation into how external actors can best support local 
processes of and conditions for empowerment and accountability. This report investigates 
the World Bank’s incorporation of CE into project design, the critical early stage of donor 
engagement. To accomplish this, ARC reviewed the World Bank’s fiscal year 2015–17 
investment project portfolios for four A4EA priority countries, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan, which covers 57 projects that range from US$19 million to U$600 
million. The analysis determines whether projects commit to seeking a strategic approach to 
CE, which involves combining multiple tactics so that the whole could be greater than the 
sum of the parts. This assessment of CE commitments is intended to help to inform possible 
national, civil society organisation strategies to monitor whether and how these commitments 
are actually implemented in practice. 
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Executive summary 
In 2013, then World Bank president Jim Yong Kim publicly promised that the institution 
would improve its engagement with citizens by incorporating feedback into 100 per cent of 
its projects with ‘identifiable beneficiaries’. The goal took formal shape as the 2014 ‘Strategic 
Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement’ (CE Strategy) that ‘incorporates citizen 
engagement, including beneficiary feedback, specifically in its treatment of inclusion, which 
entails empowering citizens to participate in the development process and integrating citizen 
voice in development programs as key accelerators to achieving results’ (Manroth et al. 
2014: 1).  
 
How and to what degree is the World Bank putting its new institutional citizen engagement 
(CE) commitments into practice? This question guides an independent assessment that the 
Accountability Research Center (ARC) at American University is undertaking as part of the 
Institute of Development Studies’ (IDS) Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) 
research programme’s investigation into how external actors can best support local 
processes of and conditions for empowerment and accountability. This report investigates 
the World Bank’s incorporation of CE into project design, the critical early stage of donor 
engagement. To accomplish this, ARC reviewed the World Bank’s fiscal year (FY) 2015–17 
investment project portfolios for four A4EA priority countries, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan, which altogether covers 57 projects that range from US$19 million to 
U$600 million. The research has produced four independent, in-depth reports that 
encapsulate each country’s unique findings, including a within-country comparative analyses 
among projects. This kind of in-depth analysis of CE in project design is necessary but not 
sufficient to assess whether and how the World Bank and government partners actually 
implement CE commitments. Such an assessment of project commitments is intended to 
help to inform possible national, civil society organisation (CSO) strategies to monitor 
whether and how these commitments are actually implemented in practice. 
 
This research on the World Bank is one component of A4EA’s broader investigation into how 
external actors, particularly large donors, are supporting empowerment and accountability in 
fragile, conflict and violence affected settings (FCVAS). This focus on the World Bank is 
timely. On the one hand, with its institutional clout and the proportion of development 
assistance it administers, the World Bank is in a unique position to encourage state actors in 
FCVAS to protect and foster the contribution of citizen voice to development effectiveness. 
With the CE strategy, the institution has laid out much needed guidance on how large-scale 
development projects can encourage arenas for citizen action as well as state response 
capacity, which in FCVAS is most likely to be lacking. On the other hand, across all settings, 
the World Bank primarily funds government-led, ‘induced’ participation in project-created 
spaces and rarely finances initiatives that specifically target public accountability and 
empowerment. The CE strategy acknowledges the kinds of risks, such as ‘elite capture’, that 
induced participatory efforts face yet it remains unclear how the World Bank is actually 
addressing these risks in both project design and implementation. The potential contribution 
of such a strategy on citizen engagement, the risks of the World Bank’s induced approach to 
CE, including elite capture, and the unique implications of both for FCVAS, underscores the 
relevance of this independent assessment. 
 
In this context, ARC has developed and piloted an assessment tool that examines whether 
and how the World Bank commits to citizen engagement in project design. The tool covers 
seven priority citizen engagement areas identified in the CE strategy. These include: 
 
 Consultation during project preparation 
 Collaborative decision-making during project implementation 
 Citizen feedback opportunities throughout the project lifecycle 
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 Citizen involvement in project monitoring 
 Grievance redress mechanisms 
 Capacity building for citizen engagement 
 Improved CE monitoring and results reporting. 
 
The approach then expands the scope beyond CE project mechanisms to three additional 
measures that ARC hypothesises could potentially facilitate an enabling environment for CE. 
These include: 
 
 Measures for proactive social inclusion (i.e. related to gender, disability, ethnicity, 
age, migrant status, etc.) in citizen engagement efforts 
 Third-party monitoring for project results and citizen feedback findings – which could 
inform CE if accompanied by 
 Proactive public information disclosure of project results and findings from citizen 
engagement efforts and the project progress. 
 
The goal of the overall analysis is to determine whether projects commit to seeking a 
strategic approach to CE, which involves combining multiple tactics so that the whole could 
be greater than the sum of the parts. This assessment builds from the 2018 study of CE by 
the World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), distinguishing between projects 
that apply the CE framework with a minimalist, ‘tick box’ approach (‘thin’ in the language of 
IEG), and projects that commit to pursuing multiple CE approaches (what IEG calls ‘thick’). 
This A4EA assessment uses the IEG’s thin/thick differentiation, applying an original ‘Citizen 
Engagement Density Scale’ that ranks the varied ‘thickness’ of project commitments to 
citizen engagement across five categories (robust, comprehensive, intermediate, weak and 
low).  
 
The key overarching findings from the four country review include:  
 
 The ARC CE Density Scale classifies the 57 total projects assessed as: robust (47 per 
cent or 25 projects), comprehensive (10 per cent or 7 projects), intermediate (27 per 
cent or 15 projects), weak (11 per cent or 7 projects), and low (6 per cent or 3 
projects). Among the four countries, Nigerian and Mozambican projects showcase 
substantially higher thickness results than those in Pakistan and Myanmar.   
 The most common project design commitment is to incorporate a project-specific 
grievance redress mechanism (GRM) (91 per cent), while citizen involvement in 
monitoring is promised in the fewest projects (52 per cent).  
 There is a substantial discrepancy between the CE mechanisms that projects commit 
to in design and what they commit to measure and report on. Of the 91 per cent of 
projects that pledge to carry out project specific GRMs, only 22 per cent include a 
monitoring indicator dedicated to measuring GRM processes and/or results.   
 A high 90 per cent of projects across the four countries commit to adopting measures 
for proactive social inclusion in citizen engagement processes. The overwhelming 
majority cover gender inclusion, however, with very few addressing the proactive 
engagement of other socially excluded groups.  
 Commitment to proactive information disclosure of both project and citizen 
engagement results is limited, with only slightly more than half (30 of the 57 assessed 
projects) reporting this commitment. Myanmar projects have the lowest commitment 
level, at 37 per cent. Commitments to proactive disclosure are rarely linked with third-
party monitoring, meaning few projects declare an intention to share findings from 
external monitors with the public. 
 There is a greater emphasis on ‘reporting up’ to World Bank management rather than 
‘reporting out’ to the public at large, even when projects commit to third-party 
10 
 
monitoring and implementing mechanisms for collecting citizen feedback and 
grievance redress. 
 Few projects provide specifics on how they plan to carry out citizen engagement. 
Therefore ‘thickness’, in terms of the quantity of committed activities, rarely translates 
to ‘thickness’ in terms of specificity of the plans themselves. 
 It is rare for projects to specify dedicated funding for citizen engagement in project 
design, increasing the likelihood that CE will be an unfunded mandate during 
implementation, competing with other priorities. 
 Each country portfolio includes at least one project that models both high density of CE 
commitments as well as high specificity in CE plans and measures to create an 
enabling environment. These potentially ‘model’ projects demonstrate that the World 
Bank is capable of more systematically planning for and reporting on citizen 
engagement.  
 
The above findings relate only to the ways in which the World Bank has (or has not) 
committed to incorporating citizen engagement mechanisms and activities in project design 
in Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan. The question of how those commitments 
are ultimately implemented (or not) in practice is critical, and for future work. 
 
 
1  Introduction  
1.1 Overview   
‘We must become a better listener,’ the World Bank’s then-president Jim Kim acknowledged 
during his keynote speech at the World Bank/IMF’s 2013 annual meetings. He continued: 
‘Last year we had beneficiary feedback on 34 per cent of our projects. We promise that for 
our projects with clear beneficiaries, we will get feedback – from every single one of them, 
100 per cent’ (Kim 2013). By announcing this to an audience of high-level government 
officials, President Kim committed the World Bank to improving how it engages with the 
people affected by its projects and to developing measurements of these achievements. 
 
In 2014, World Bank management translated Kim’s public promise into a set of corporate 
requirements for citizen engagement in investment project financing (IPF) operations. IPFs 
are the World Bank’s leading lending instrument and are used for long-term operations (i.e. 
periods of five to ten years) across all sectors, but primarily concentrated in infrastructure, 
human development, agriculture, and public administration (World Bank 2018d). The new 
CE requirements oblige IPF projects with ‘identifiable beneficiaries’ and approved between  
1 July 2014 and 30 June 2017 to: (1) incorporate a least one citizen engagement (CE) 
mechanism, (2) integrate at least one indicator to monitor CE, and (3) report on the CE 
indicator by the third year of project implementation (World Bank 2018a). 
 
To provide operational guidance for meeting the new institutional CE mandate and to more 
systematically incorporate citizen engagement into operations, the World Bank then 
produced a ‘Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement’ (abbreviated in 
this report as ‘CE strategy’). As laid out in the CE strategy, the World Bank envisions citizen 
engagement as:  
 
The two-way interaction between citizens and governments or the private sector 
within the scope of [World Bank] interventions – policy dialogue, programs, projects, 
and advisory services and analytics – that gives citizens a stake in decision-making 
with the objective of improving the intermediate and final development outcomes of the 
intervention. 
(Manroth et al. 2014: 8) 
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This definition establishes World Bank-fostered CE as reciprocal and bounded. It is 
reciprocal because it requires government to respond to citizen demands and not simply 
extract their input for consideration. Yet it is bounded because it applies only to government-
citizen interactions encompassed by World Bank interventions and therefore stops short of 
considering the implications for broader citizen-state relations and accountability.   
 
How and to what degree is the World Bank fulfilling the goals of its CE strategy and actually 
embedding mechanisms for citizen engagement in project design? In 2017, the 
Accountability Research Center (ARC) at American University, member of the Institute of 
Development Studies’ (IDS) Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research 
programme launched an investigation of World Bank’s fulfilment of its citizen engagement 
agenda. This research comprises one component of A4EA’s broader investigation into if and 
how external actors, particularly large donors, are supporting empowerment and 
accountability in FCVAS. A4EA chose to focus this line of inquiry on the World Bank 
because, even as civic space around the world is restricted, the World Bank has the 
potential to support government counterparts to protect and foster the contribution of citizen 
voice to development effectiveness.  
 
The investigation encompasses a two-track monitoring and advocacy approach: 
 
 The first track aims to independently monitor whether and how the World Bank is 
integrating CE into project design. It relies on a desk review of publicly available 
documents to identify how individual projects commit to incorporating engagement with 
citizens throughout the project lifecycle. Evidence from this track is the basis for this 
Working Paper. 
 The second track focuses on implementation, using findings on project commitments 
to CE to launch partner-led action research. It aims to monitor how citizen engagement 
commitments are actually being carried out in specific World Bank projects and 
requires extensive field research informed by local knowledge. Lessons from pilot field 
research in Myanmar for this track are included in this paper. 
 
To guide the independent monitoring process, ARC developed an assessment tool to 
identify the nature of the World Bank’s commitments to citizen engagement as incorporated 
into project design. ARC’s assessment tool uses the official project documents made public 
on through World Bank’s online operations portal to identify whether and how projects 
commit to: 
 
 Citizen engagement mechanisms throughout the project lifecycle: i.e. public 
meetings, satisfaction surveys, and participatory monitoring. 
 Mechanisms that could facilitate an enabling environment for CE: i.e. third-party 
monitoring, procedures for social inclusion, plans for proactive information disclosure.  
 
By examining project commitments to specific CE activities, along with mechanisms that 
potentially strengthen the enabling environment for CE, ARC’s analysis seeks to answer two 
overarching questions: to what degree do World Bank projects demonstrate a commitment 
to minimum standards for informed citizen engagement? To what degree do projects go 
beyond a minimalist ‘tick the box’ approach and demonstrate that there is both depth and 
specificity in individual CE commitments and a potential for synergy across the range of CE 
commitments?  
 
To pilot the assessment tool, ARC undertook a desk review of all publicly available 
programme documents for the investment project financing (IFP) portfolios (FY15–17) in four 
A4EA priority countries: Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan, jointly selected with 
the A4EA funder, UK Department for International Development (DFID). These four country 
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portfolios include a total of 57 projects, with loans that range from US$19 million to U$600 
million. The research has produced four independent, in-depth reports that encapsulate each 
country’s unique findings, including a within-country comparative analysis. These country 
portfolio reviews are available as detailed stand-alone reports for use by national and local 
CSOs, researchers and policymakers (see Ha et al. 2019; Nadelman, Ha and Sah 2019; 
Nadelman et al. 2019; Sah and Nadelman 2019). To pilot field research on how CE 
commitments are carried out in practice, ARC and its in-country partner the Bank Information 
Center (BIC) conducted 12 months’ fieldwork in Myanmar on three projects at the most 
advanced stages of implementation.  
 
This A4EA research recognises that the World Bank, in contrast to other large-scale donors, 
rarely finances initiatives designed to target public accountability and empowerment. Instead 
the institution takes a more indirect approach to E&A by funding government-led 
participation in ‘invited’ spaces (Mansuri and Rao 2013: xi) created within projects whose 
main objectives are typically not empowerment related. The World Bank’s approach to civic 
engagement has been described in the literature as induced participation because it results 
from government and donor organised and/or funded efforts to which citizens are invited to 
participate and may be bureaucratically managed (Mansuri and Rao 2013: xi, 1).1 As 
explained in its CE strategy, the World Bank’s approach to CE ‘entails empowering citizens 
to participate in the development process and integrating citizen voice in development 
programs as key accelerators to achieving results’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 1). The implication 
is that if, in addition to achieving the main objectives, the project also leads to longer-term 
empowerment and/or accountability outcomes, it is a positive, but auxiliary, benefit.    
 
Although induced participation continues to dominate the World Bank’s approach to CE, the 
institution has also published extensive research that documents the shortcomings, including 
widespread patterns of ‘elite capture’ of induced participatory efforts (Mansuri and Rao 
2013). Indeed, the CE strategy openly acknowledges the literature documenting these risks 
(Manroth et al. 2014: 95; Haque 2008; Gugerty and Kremer 2008). However, in the World 
Bank’s current efforts to mainstream CE in operations, it remains unclear whether or how 
actual projects address this key risk in design or implementation.  
 
How might the World Bank’s project-specific CE approaches, centred on invited 
opportunities for participation, relate to the broader challenge of addressing the growing 
wave of restrictions on civic space, particular in FCVAS? The World Bank’s CE strategy 
discusses both the potential risks and contributions of citizen engagement initiatives in 
FCVAS, acknowledging that: 
 
In such contexts, engaging with citizens is not without risk, as it can contribute to 
further fragility or conflict and can entail greater personal risk for those engaged. At the 
same time, opportunities for CE can be explored in settings where there is precedent 
for state–citizen interaction, local government structures exist, or there are local 
customary institutions and other intermediaries that have the government’s trust and 
the capability to mobilize citizens.  
(Manroth et al. 2014: 15) 
 
The risk that such citizen engagement processes in FCVAS face, including but not limited to 
putting those that participate in peril and elite capture, highlight the relevance of this kind of 
independent assessment of whether and how meaningful spaces for citizen engagement are 
actually created in practice.  
 
                                                          
1  Induced participation is differentiated from organic participation which can be spontaneous, or when organised it is 
done so ‘by civic groups outside government, sometimes in opposition to it’ (Mansuri and Rao 2013: xi).   
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Beyond the inherent possibilities and risks already discussed, what are the implications of 
the World Bank’s CE agenda, if any, for empowering citizens to engage their governments 
beyond the boundaries of World Bank-funded operations? Furthermore, what might this 
mean, if anything, for increasing governments’ accountability to citizens? Will such spaces 
for engagement necessarily be limited to projects for which they are created, or might there 
be positive spillovers? To answer these questions, one needs to first determine what kinds 
of spaces these projects actually create in practice. That process is likely to be uneven and 
contested, and this study focuses on the first step: What do World Bank projects commit to 
doing? 
 
Within this context and line of enquiry, this report synthesises the findings from the 
independent CE assessments of Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan (FY15–17). 
This section provides background and context. It builds from the overview and provides the 
reader with a dual-purpose primer on the basics of World Bank’s project-based lending and 
the evolution of the institution’s engagement with citizens and civil society related to in-
country operations. It also details the 2014 World Bank CE strategy and describes ARC’s 
methodology, explaining the investigative process and its contribution. Section 2 presents a 
cross-country comparison of the four country portfolio trends, highlighting notable country 
and project-specific findings. Section 3 provides a synthesis of the lessons derived from the 
individual country trends and cross-country patterns. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a 
critical discussion of what these World Bank project-based findings can tell advocates, 
proponents and scholars of citizen empowerment and accountability about how the World 
Bank’s approach to fostering citizen engagement contributes (or does not contribute) to E&A 
outcomes and processes in FCVAS.   
 
1.2 Citizen engagement and World Bank operations: present and past 
The 2014 CE Strategy claims that,  
 
under the right circumstances, CE can contribute to achieving development outcomes 
in support of the goals the WBG [World Bank Group] aims to support through all of the 
operations it funds: eradicating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a 
sustainable manner.  
(Manroth et al. 2014: 1) 
 
The WBG encompasses five distinct international organisations. These include: 
 
 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
the International Development Association (IDA), which work primarily with 
governments, 
 The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which support private sector investment,  
 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which 
adjudicates investment disputes that arise between international private sector 
companies and governments.   
 
Headquartered in Washington DC, in 2017 the five branches of the WBG provided close to 
US$59 billion in loans, grants, equity investments, and guarantees to both partner 
governments and the private sector in developing and transition countries (World Bank 
2017a: 1).  
 
This CE investigation focuses on the two government-serving WBG branches, IBRD and 
IDA, which together are most commonly known collectively under the umbrella moniker the 
‘World Bank’. This oftentimes confusing title of World Bank for just two of the five entities that 
comprise the WBG results because ‘the IBRD and IDA constitute the World Bank proper, 
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while the ICSID, IFC and MIGA are ‘affiliates’ that ‘are closely associated with the World 
Bank’ (Bebbington et al. 2006: 10). Owned and managed by its 189 country members, 
IBRD/IDA (henceforth referred to as the ‘the World Bank’) provided 71 per cent of the WBG’s 
2017 global financial assistance (US$42.1 billion of the total US$59 billion provided (World 
Bank 2017: 4)). The primary vehicles through which the World Bank provides financial 
assistance are autonomous projects, also called operations.2  
 
Officially recipient governments have authority over World Bank financed projects. However, 
the actual lines of authority are not always clear to those outside the institution. Contributing 
to the lack of clarity is the World Bank’s common reliance on Project Implementation Units 
(PIUs) to manage operations rather than turning over management to directly to government 
agencies and their civil service staff. Instead, PIUs, also known as ‘autonomous units’, 
‘enclave projects’, ‘Project Management Units (PMUs)’ and ‘Special Management Units 
(SMUs)’ are specifically created and staffed for a given project with a lifespan that only 
continues for the duration of the project. World Bank teams justify the reliance on PIUs 
because they ‘fill in the technical skills gap in the administration of development assistance 
programs in the Bank’s borrower countries’ and/or replace ‘regular civil service staff… fully 
employed with existing responsibilities or… unable to take on the additional tasks involved 
with major Bank projects’ (Word Bank 2005: 1–2). While some PIUs can be semi-integrated 
into sector ministries, the commonly used stand-alone PIU exists outside the structure of 
government ministries/agencies. As a result, standalone PIUs often recreate the functions 
and capabilities of the ministry a project has been designed to serve (World Bank 2005: 6). 
This begs the question, is the project management more accountable to the World Bank 
team that created it than to the client country that agreed to the project?  
 
World Bank management has ‘long recommended that stand-alone project implementation 
units (PIUs) be mainstreamed into existing ministry structures, because they are inconsistent 
with the Bank’s mission of capacity development and institutional strengthening in 
developing countries’ (World Bank 2005: 1). Yet a substantial number of projects have 
continued to rely on PIUs, even in countries with well-established and high-functioning 
institutions, because ‘external and internal incentives work toward organizational 
arrangements that favour the short-term goal of safeguarding project fiduciary and 
performance objectives’ (World Bank 2005: 2–3). Regardless of the kind of entity that 
manages a World Bank-financed project, it is responsible for all aspects of project 
implementation, including carrying out commitments to citizen engagement.   
 
1.3 Antecedents to the World Bank’s 2014 CE strategy 
The 2014 CE Strategy is the outcome of more than 45 years of evolving approaches to 
engagement between the World Bank, civil society, and project affected peoples in 
participant countries. A list of key actions, publications and events is listed chronologically 
below (for more in-depth discussion see Fox and Brown 1998; Davis 2004; World Bank 
2005; Bebbington et al. 2006; World Bank 2007; Weaver 2008; Manroth et al. 2014; World 
Bank 2018c). 
 
 Publication of The Use of Anthropology in Project Operations (1973). This report, 
written by Glynn Cochrane and Raymond Naronha, based on a review of World Bank 
problem projects from 1968 to 1972, was one of the very first published by the Bank to 
identify cultural issues on development and the social impacts of land acquisition and 
resettlement.   
                                                          
2  The World Bank’s development assistance falls into two broad categories: financing and services. Financing 
encompasses the following financial instruments: investment project financing, development policy financing, program-
for-results, trust funds and grants, private sector options, customised options and risk management and multiphase 
programmatic approaches. Services include: technical assistance (TA), reimbursable advisory services (RAS), 
economic and sector work (ESW), business advice, and donor aid coordination (see World Bank 2018d). 
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 Passage of the first social safeguard policies (1980, 1982). A watershed moment 
began in the early 1980s with the establishment of a set of mandatory safeguarding 
policies to mitigate harm caused by World Bank projects. Primarily focused on 
environmental issues, the policies also included two ‘social’ safeguards. The first, 
adopted in 1980, set protections and compensation standards for people affected by 
project-caused involuntary resettlement and the second, adopted in 1982, mandated 
protections for indigenous peoples. 
 Publication of Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development 
(1985). This volume, edited by the World Bank’s first non-economist social scientist 
staff member, sociologist Michael Cernea, was the first World Bank publication 
concerned with the roles of people and local associations in development projects 
intended to challenge the ‘economic reductionism’ in the institution’s theory of 
development (Bebbington et al. 2006: 15).  
 Formation of environmental divisions across the World Bank (1987). In response 
to international criticism of social and environmental impacts of large-scale World Bank 
funded infrastructure projects, in the late 1980s the World Bank created new 
environmental divisions within its departments. Under the environmental umbrella, 
these new divisions evolved to also incorporate social expertise revolving around 
mitigating the negative effects of projects on people. To staff these new divisions, 
hiring of non-economist social scientists increased. Although scattered throughout the 
Bank, they began to link up informally with the creation of a ‘Sociology Group’. 
 Establishment of the Participatory Development Learning Group (1990) convened 
to develop approaches and practices for participation in World Bank operations. This 
led to experimentation with community participation in Bank projects and, in 1994, a 
high-profile conference on participation that brought together Bank and non-Bank 
actors. 
 Production of The Resettlement Review and subsequent establishment of the 
Division of Social Policy and Resettlement (1993). For the first time the World Bank 
reviewed its project experience with resettlement and the resulting, highly 
disseminated report was highly critical because of evidence that resettlement caused 
by World Bank operations had exacerbated or created poverty, in many cases 
because projects were not in fact following established policies. 
 Establishment of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel for IBRD/IDA projects 
(established 1993, operationalised 1994), an independent accountability mechanism 
to which people who believe they have been adversely affected by Bank-financed 
operations can bring their concerns. The panel determines whether Bank projects 
have complied with policies and procedures. The World Bank Inspection Panel, as the 
first independent entity created to promote accountability within an international 
financial institution, set a precedent that other multilateral and regional financial 
institutions have since followed. 
 Publication of The Participation Sourcebook (1996), the World Bank’s first official 
how-to publication for incorporating participatory approaches into projects. It is 
important to note that recognition of such approaches and institutional funding 
provided to publications to disseminate the approach did not mean they became 
standard Bank practice.  
 The recognition of a social development ‘professional family’ (1996) and 
subsequent formation of a Social Development Network and department (1997). 
As part of an institution-wide reorganisation of technical and operational staff, the 
World Bank created the Social Development Network within the Vice-Presidency for 
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (ESSD). This led to both the 
creation of social development units across the Bank’s regions and a Social 
Development Board composed of regional representatives. From its inception, the 
Social Development Network produced ‘how-to’ notes on different ways to integrate 
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social development and the operationalisation of engagement with project affected 
people. These social development guidance notes continue to be produced today.   
 The development of guidelines for consultation with civil society. The NGO/Civil 
Society Unit under the guidance of social development specialist William Reuben 
issued Guidelines for Consultation with Civil Society in 1999, and produced an 
expanded sourcebook in 2002. This document provides practical guidance on 
structuring dialogue between governments and civil society and setting realistic 
expectations about what can be achieved. 
 Launch of new non-economic driven strategic approaches: Social Development 
Strategy (2005) and Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy (GAC) (2007). 
These two World Bank operational strategies prioritised social accountability and 
demand-side governance. Updated in 2012, the GAC Strategy accentuated the 
importance of governance and anticorruption in the World Bank’s efforts to reduce 
poverty and promote growth, putting greater emphasis on the roles of transparency 
and openness.  
 Establishment of the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) (2012). 
Developed to complement traditional World Bank assistance, the GPSA provides 
direct, sustained support to civil society organisations from countries that opt into the 
initiative. A central goal for the GPSA is to build capacity for CSOs to engage in social 
accountability initiatives.  
 
The 2014 CE strategy is an outgrowth of this progress at the World Bank. Nevertheless, it is 
considered new and different from earlier participation, safeguard and social accountability 
efforts, because it represents the first formalised framework with institution-wide reach that 
provides comprehensive guidance for engaging citizens from a project’s inception to its 
completion 
 
1.4 The World Bank’s 2014 strategic framework for mainstreaming citizen 
engagement 
As explained in the introduction to the IEG’s 2018 investigation on CE: 
 
The 2014 strategic framework aimed to provide a more coherent approach to 
incorporating citizen engagement across Bank Group operations. The framework 
builds on lessons from Bank Group-financed operations across regions and sectors 
and underscores the importance of country context, government ownership, and clear 
objectives for citizen engagement.  
(World Bank 2018c: ix) 
 
The CE strategy outlines several key categories of citizen engagement:3 
 
                                                          
3  The CE strategy describes categories of citizen engagement mechanisms as follows: consultations; GRMs; collecting, 
recording, and reporting on inputs received from citizens; collaboration in decision-making; citizen-led monitoring, 
evaluation, or oversight; empowering citizens with resources and authority over their use; and citizen capacity building 
for engagement (Manroth 2014: 31). The ARC assessment includes all CE strategy categories except ‘empowering 
citizens without resources and authority over their use’ for several key reasons. First, as described in the strategy, the 
only kinds of World Bank projects that are in the position to implement mechanisms in this category are those designed 
to be community driven development and therefore does not pertain to the majority of World Bank operations. By 
creating a CE category that only projects using a CDD approach can fulfil, the strategy privileges this particular 
development model and creates a high level category into which, by definition, no other types of projects could reach. 
Furthermore, this framing takes for granted that the kinds of participatory mechanisms that comprise CDD approaches 
will lead to empowerment among those participating in the project. Although this study does not discount the benefit of 
CDD approaches and the embedded participatory opportunities it creates, it does not accept the underlying premise 
that by their implementation empowerment is achieved (see Mansuri and Rao 2013). Therefore, the ARC assessment 
did not use this category, understanding that participatory mechanisms that are part of the design of CDD operations 
will be captured in the other categories. 
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Figure 1.1 Categories of CE in World Bank projects 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
1. Consultation. Formally, the term ‘consultation’ in the context of World Bank projects, 
captures engagement with citizens in the design or project preparation stage before an 
operation has been approved by the World Bank Board. The World Bank describes the 
objectives for citizen consultations as receiving input about the design and 
implementation arrangements of a development programme or project, in order to 
contribute to improved results and sustainability. Distinct from dialogue, the World 
Bank defines consultation as ‘a more structured exchange in which the convener 
commits to “active listening” and to carefully consider the comments, ideas, and 
recommendations received… Common consultation methods include public hearings 
or meetings, focus group discussions, household surveys and interviews, electronic 
consultations, and advisory/expert groups.’ They can also include ‘more informal 
structures at the local level, such as village councils and women’s groups’ (Manroth et 
al. 2014: 42).   
2. Collaborative decision-making. This process goes beyond consultation and 
integrates citizens directly into decision-making processes. The goal is to make 
decisions more responsive to citizens’ needs and improve the sustainability of 
programme and project outcomes through increased citizen ownership. Mechanisms 
for collaboration include ‘citizen/user membership in decision-making bodies, integrity 
pacts, participatory planning and budgeting, and citizens’ juries’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 
43). 
3. Collecting, recording, and reporting on inputs from citizens. This refers to citizen 
feedback collected periodically during and after implementation on different 
dimensions of provided services, including but not limited to effectiveness, 
inclusiveness, quality, delivery time, transaction costs, targeting, resource utilisation or 
engagement processes. Some tools used in projects to capture citizen inputs include 
‘satisfaction surveys, focus group discussions, hotlines, community scorecards, citizen 
report cards, or SMS/online feedback’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 44).  
4. Complaint and grievance redress mechanisms (GRMs). These are complaint 
systems through which project affected peoples can raise concerns, queries or 
clarifications related to implementation and through which complaints and grievances 
are addressed.  For the purpose of this analysis, we have focused on project specific 
GRMs which are intended to be designed to be context specific and not the more 
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generic grievance redress services (GRS) offered via the World Bank’s operations 
online portal (Manroth et al. 2014: 45).    
5. Citizen monitoring, evaluation and oversight. Citizen monitoring goes beyond 
citizen feedback processes and directly involves citizens in monitoring service delivery, 
revenues, budget execution, procurement, contract awards, and reform policies. The 
philosophy behind such intensive citizen involvement is that it can increase 
transparency, improve efficiency of service delivery and budget execution and reduce 
opportunities for corruption. Some commonly used mechanisms for citizen-led 
monitoring include ‘public expenditure tracking surveys, social audits, or citizen report 
cards’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 47). 
6. Capacity building for citizen engagement. This capacity building is specifically 
designed for citizens, CSOs, communities, government officials, and national 
accountability institutions to strengthen their engagement and participation in project 
implementation (service delivery, natural resource management, public financial 
management, and/or Community Driven Development (CDD) projects).4 This is 
considered particularly necessary for World Bank-supported operations where CE 
approaches are introduced for the first time and include a focus on building 
government capacity for sustainability of engagement processes, beyond the life of a 
project (Manroth et al. 2014: 50).  
7. Improved monitoring and results reporting. The CE strategy states that a key 
objective of the framework is to develop a better understanding of and monitoring of 
CE outcomes in World Bank-supported operations (Manroth et al. 2014: 54–55). The 
strategy emphasises that projects would benefit from incorporating dedicated CE 
indicators into monitoring systems, especially within their results framework.5 
Furthermore, the strategy suggests incorporating third-party monitoring to ensure 
independent, accurate reporting.  
 
The CE strategy’s status as a ‘strategy’ rather than a ‘policy’ means that it is not mandatory. 
The CE strategy recognises this limitation, acknowledging that ‘the large majority of CE 
mechanisms in projects to date are motivated by safeguard requirements’ (Manroth et al. 
2014: 106).6 When fulfilling social safeguard requirements, consultations during project 
preparation and GRMs become mandatory. Therefore, social safeguards have been viewed 
as an important and logical entry-point for CE activities which can then lead to additional 
opportunities to integrate and expand citizen engagement measures beyond the limited 
requirements set by the strategy. Furthermore, the CE strategy identifies additional context-
specific opportunities for scaling up CE. 
 
                                                          
4  CDD is defined at the World Bank as ‘an approach that gives control over planning decisions and investment resources 
for local development projects to community groups’ (World Bank 2018b).  
5  Results framework is the overarching term used by the World Bank to describe the context in which results are 
internally measured and monitored. In practice, it includes only a small number of indicators that together are intended 
to explain how the project development objective (PDO) is to be achieved. What is significant is that the indicators 
included in a project’s results framework must: (1) explain how the data collected will be used over the course of project 
implementation and, (2) be publicly disclosed. Therefore, if the results framework includes an indicator on CE, the 
project must disclose information publicly, at least about this particular area. However, the process by which these 
results are considered to meet this requirement is through bi-annual Implementation Status and Results Reports 
(ISRs). These short documents which typically include basic numerical reporting and minimal accounting of process or 
explanatory detail, are made available only via the project pages of the World Bank’s website. 
6  In October 2018 (FY19) the World Bank enacted a new Environment and Social Framework (ESF) to manage 
operational risks for IPF. This replaces the World Bank’s prior environment and social policies (referred to as 
safeguards) and according to the World Bank: ‘makes important advances in areas such as transparency, non-
discrimination, public participation, and accountability — including expanded roles for grievance mechanisms. It brings 
the World Bank’s environmental and social protections into closer harmony with those of other development institutions’ 
(World Bank 2019). The ESF includes ten environment and social standards, with ESS 10 providing guidelines for 
stakeholder engagement and information disclosure. The previous safeguards system remains in place for projects 
developed before 1 October 2018, with the new ESF applying thereafter. At the time of publication, the process for 
incorporating ESS 10 into CE strategy implementation is still ongoing. See: www.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/environmental-and-social-framework. 
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As explained in the overview, the CE strategy provides operational guidance to accompany 
the World Bank’s 2014 corporate commitment that 100 per cent of IPFs with clearly identified 
beneficiaries incorporate citizen engagement in new projects by FY2018. The corporate 
commitment specifies that IPFs must meet three benchmarks. These are:  
 
A. Incorporating a minimum of one mechanism designed to engage beneficiaries in the 
specific context of the project; 
B. Integrating a minimum of one indicator to monitor a particular aspect of citizen 
engagement during project implementation;  
C. Reporting on the beneficiary feedback indicator by the third year of implementation, 
which for IPFs is typically between one-third and half way through.  
 
Furthermore, to be considered an acceptable CE indicator, a project indicator must meet one 
of the following criteria: 
 
 Clearly capture citizen feedback and in so doing report whether there is a tangible 
response to close the feedback loop; or 
 Monitor the extent to which citizens are involved in decision-making related to project 
design, implementation and oversight. 
 
It is essential to recognise that the accompanying corporate commitment is what now 
makes citizen engagement compulsory for IPF. This commitment moves the strategy in a 
mandatory direction. Yet, there are concerns that project compliance with these minimal 
requirements, and the limited application to only one kind of lending instrument, will not 
ultimately lead to the World Bank’s meaningful operationalisation of citizen engagement.  
 
The minimal requirements, under which projects are obligated only to incorporate one 
CE mechanism and indicator, allows for a ‘tick box’ approach to compliance. This risks 
World Bank project monitoring falling short of capturing the extent to which projects are 
actually fulfilling the guidance laid out in the strategy. Furthermore, the fact that projects are 
not responsible for reporting on results until implementation year three, significantly limits the 
prospects that any citizen feedback will meaningfully inform implementation decisions.    
 
Two World Bank entities have undertaken evaluations of Bank progress in incorporating CE 
into project design – The Social Development Practice in the Europe/Central Asia (ECA) 
region and the IEG. The former created a Citizen Engagement Quality Index to measure the 
quality of citizen engagement activity in all board approved IPFs in the ECA region. The 
results have not been published, but representatives of the ECA team have shared an 
overview of findings in presentations with civil society (Plummer 2018).  
 
More prominently, in 2017–18 the IEG undertook a corporate evaluation of the early 
implementation of the CE agenda. The evaluation’s purpose is to inform the Bank’s Board of 
Executive Directors and management ‘on the effectiveness of mainstreaming citizen 
engagement to support development processes and outcomes.’ IEG chose to focus on the 
CE agenda in order to provide ‘a timely contribution to any review and update of the 
corporate citizen engagement goals, targets, and approaches on completion of the 2018 
corporate citizen engagement commitment’ (World Bank 2018c: x). See Box 1.1 below for 
the main findings highlighted in the 2018 IEG report about meeting the corporate targets and 
the quality of CE. 
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Box 1.1  IEG main findings on citizen engagement 
Meeting the target  
 The commitment to mainstreaming citizen engagement and tracking progress in the 
corporate scorecard mobilised senior management and received buy-in from staff. 
 Engagement mechanisms not tied to safeguards are now more prevalent, denoting 
a move toward a more proactive approach. 
 Although the World Bank Group leverages its new country engagement model to 
consult with a wider range of stakeholders, it is not using the full range of entry 
points to involve citizens in strategic decision making and policy dialogue.  
 Monitoring of citizen engagement remains weak beyond tracking progress on 
corporate targets: indicators rarely track results of all mechanisms used nor are 
designed to capture whether the feedback loop with citizens is closed (World Bank 
2018c: 11–12). 
 
Enhancing the quality of citizen engagement  
 The World Bank Group has rightfully made the quality of citizen engagement a 
cornerstone of its mainstreaming commitment. The evaluation focused on four 
quality principles highlighted by the strategic framework: results orientation, 
continuity and feedback loop, social inclusion, and capacity enhancement. 
 Although closing the feedback loop with citizens is an intrinsic part of the Bank 
Group’s engagement, it is neither mainstreamed nor tracked.  
 Inclusion of women and marginalised groups is not systematically 
scrutinised. 
 Numerous examples of high-quality mechanisms appear in the World Bank’s 
portfolio as well as some encouraging trends: projects that use multiple 
engagement mechanisms and pay attention to social inclusion are on the rise. 
 However, thin engagement remains the most prevalent and essential capacity 
building for engagement is limited. There is significant scope for pursuing 
opportunities for deeper engagement when the context allows. 
 The insufficient attention paid to quality principles points to a trade-off between 
meeting the mostly quantitative corporate targets and ensuring quality of 
engagement (World Bank 2018c: 26–27). 
 
1.5 Assessing citizen engagement in World Bank projects: scope and 
methodology 
ARC’s CE assessment focuses on ten key areas of investigation. The initial seven are 
derived from the priority citizen engagement areas detailed in the 2014 CE strategy 
(explained above). ARC developed the final three based on their potential to create an 
enabling environment for citizen engagement. These additional areas include: 
 
 Measures for proactive social inclusion (i.e. related to gender, disability, ethnicity, age, 
migrant status, etc.) in citizen engagement efforts; 
 Third-party monitoring and verification for project results and citizen feedback findings. 
The World Bank defines third-party monitoring as:  
 
Monitoring by parties that are external to the project or program’s direct beneficiary 
chain or management structure to assess whether intended outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts have been achieved by the project. TPM is mainly used to provide an 
independent perspective on project or government performance. It can be 
conducted by CSOs, thinktanks, academic institutions, media, or private firms. 
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These organizations generally have greater skills for monitoring than community 
representatives. 
(Van Wicklin and Gurkan 2013: 2) 
 
 Proactive disclosure of the results from citizen engagement efforts and the project 
progress and results beyond the World Bank’s minimal requirements. 
 
Figure 1.2 Indicators of an enabling environment (EE) for CE  
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
In order to foster a supportive environment for citizens to actively and meaningfully engage 
in the project lifecycle, it is essential that they are included and informed. The World Bank 
CE strategy recognises these ideas in a discussion of ‘good practice principles’ for citizen 
engagement. According to the strategy, for citizen engagement to be considered meaningful, 
best practice requires that projects provide ‘disclosure and timely access’ of ‘objective 
information and documentation’ as well as ‘due consideration of representativeness and 
inclusion of women and disadvantaged or vulnerable groups’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 42). The 
ARC approach is predicated on the understanding that no single indicator among these 
three is considered adequate on its own to support and encourage community participation.  
 
By examining project commitments across these ten areas, the analysis seeks to answer 
two overarching questions: 
 
1. To what degree do World Bank projects demonstrate a commitment to minimum 
standards for informed CE?  
2. To what degree do projects go beyond a ‘tick box’ approach and demonstrate that 
there is both depth and specificity in individual CE commitments, and a potential for 
synergy across the range of CE commitments. 
  
1.5.1 Data collection: application of the assessment tool 
ARC’s assessment tool relies on publicly available World Bank project documents that lay 
out plans, strategies and commitments that have been approved by the Bank’s Board. The 
principal documents used in the analysis include (where available): the Project Appraisal 
Document (PAD), the Project Information Document (PID), the Integrated Safeguards Data 
Sheets (ISDS), the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and related 
social safeguard documents (Resettlement and Indigenous People’s Frameworks) where 
applicable. The World Bank requires that all the above-mentioned documents be publicly 
disclosed via the World Bank’s online operations portal.  
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In principle, this assessment would also include operational manuals (OMs), which all 
projects develop after receiving World Bank board approval to describe and codify their 
implementation plan. For government–society engagement, the OM translates World Bank 
project commitments into specific actions, processes and benchmarks in each national 
context. This ‘translation’ is also key for CSOs and citizens who want to observe or monitor 
how a project is functioning. However, the World Bank does not have an institutional 
mandate that OMs must be disclosed and therefore they are typically not publicly available. 
This means, in practice, that public access to the primary operational document that most 
concretely details a project’s implementation plans for meeting the approved objectives is left 
to the client government’s discretion. When government agencies do not proactively disclose 
their specific decision-making processes, project rules and performance benchmarks, it has 
major implications for informed citizen engagement for accountability.  
 
This project assessment process is never automated and there is a strict policy of secondary 
or peer review to avoid subjective decision-making about the depth and detail of individual 
CE commitments. Once the data is collected from the publicly available World Bank 
documents, it is subjected to a quantitative and qualitative analysis. The processes for each 
are explained in the sections below.  
 
1.5.2 Quantitative analysis: establishing a citizen engagement density scale 
To answer the question of ‘whether’ World Bank projects are operationalising institutional 
commitments to CE, ARC developed and piloted a ‘Citizen Engagement Density Scale’ that 
considers the seven World Bank priority citizen engagement (CE) and three enabling 
environment (EE) indicators discussed above. The density scale builds from the literature 
(Fox 2015) and IEG (2018) findings that: 
 
‘Thick’ approaches – those combining multiple tools to enable collective action and 
public sector responsiveness – are more promising than ‘thin’ approaches – those that 
are not matched with vertical integration of independent monitoring and oversight or do 
not include support to increase government’s capacity to respond.  
(World Bank 2018: xiii) 
 
A thick approach to CE commitments combines a project’s inclusion of the various CE 
activities laid out in the World Bank’s strategy with mechanisms or practices that could 
create an enabling environment to further advance citizen action. The creation of an 
enabling environment is facilitated through the proactive social inclusion of marginalised 
groups in consultation processes, and the inclusion of independent/external monitoring with 
public disclosure of results. While the thick versus thin distinction may be intuitive and 
subjective, this desk review attempts to capture greater nuance by classifying the range of 
density of commitments according to five different categories: robust, comprehensive, 
intermediate, weak, and low. Table 1.1 depicts the combined CE and EE numerical criteria 
for each level.  
 
Table 1.1 Citizen engagement (CE) density scale  
Source: Authors’ own. 
Robust Comprehensive Intermediate Weak Low 
CE      +      EE CE        +      EE CE      +      EE CE      +      EE CE      +      EE 
7 2-3 7 0-1 6 0 4 0-1 2 0-1 
6 3 6 1-2 5 0-2 3 0-2 1 0-2 
  5 3 4 2-3 2 2-3 0 0-3 
    3 3 1 3   
Key CE = citizen engagement areas 
Maximum = 7 
EE = enabling environment indicators 
Maximum = 3 
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A project’s rating on the CE density scale depends on a combination of its CE and EE 
commitments. The final tally, however, is not based on a simple total of commitments within 
the ten possible CE and EE options. Rather, it results from a weighted combination of two 
complementary approaches to enabling citizen action. In other words, a project’s thickness is 
based on counting the number of tools for citizen action (from 0 to 7) that a project describes 
and then determining if and how they have matched with efforts that contribute to an 
enabling environment for CE. ARC’s CE density scale therefore reports on how mechanisms 
for social inclusion, external monitoring and public disclosure can potentially reinforce the 
officially recognised modalities for creating enabling environments for citizen engagement 
and accountability. 
 
Although the number of CE commitments is the first step to determining the thickness of a 
project’s approach to citizen engagement, the final determining factor is what the project 
contributes to the enabling environment. For example, Table 1.1 shows that a project that 
includes commitments in all seven Bank prioritised CE areas could fall into one of two 
categories: robust or comprehensive. Seven commitments guarantee a rank in one of the 
top two categories. However, these seven CE commitments, if not matched with at least two 
of the enabling environment indicators, is not sufficient for a project to qualify as having a 
robust approach to CE. To be considered at the robust level, the project must also include 
commitments to at least two of the EE indicators.  
 
1.5.3 Qualitative analysis: the quality of commitments, based on depth and detail 
To answer the question of how the World Bank is operationalising its commitments to citizen 
engagement in ways that could foster accountability and empowerment, the assessment 
then investigates the content of the commitments. First, it considers the detail and depth with 
which CE mechanisms and processes are explained, in terms of how they will both handle 
and incorporate stakeholders’ inputs so that they shape project decisions and 
implementation. Examples of questions that guide the process of determining CE 
mechanisms’ detail and depth include:  
 
1. Collaborative decision-making: For projects that commit to collaborative decision-
making, do projects specify the mechanisms and/or activities through which this would 
be carried out during implementation?  
2. Collecting feedback: For projects that commit to collecting citizen feedback, do 
descriptions of the planned mechanisms explain how feedback solicited and collected 
will be integrated to inform project implementation (closing the feedback loop)? 
3. Grievance redress mechanism (GRM) 
a. For projects that commit to establishing a GRM, who will manage it (the same 
unit charged with managing the project that potentially could be a subject of the 
complaints)? Will it be under the authority of or subject to oversight by a third-
party organisation to avoid conflicts of interest?  
b. What GRM data will be disclosed? Will disclosure involve numbers of complaints 
received and resolved? Will data released cover the nature of the grievances 
and their resolutions?   
 
Second, the assessment considers the detail and depth with which the project commits to 
fostering an enabling environment for CE. The hypothesis guiding this approach is that the 
less precise a CE commitment is at the project design stage, the easier it becomes for 
project authorities to impose their own interpretations. The risk therefore is that without 
sufficient specificity, CE plans can be diluted into a ‘tick box’ exercise during implementation. 
For example, the assessment asks:  
 
1. Social inclusion: For projects that commit to proactive inclusion, are details provided 
on the approaches that will be undertaken to include groups that have experienced 
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social marginalisation and exclusion in citizen engagement activities? What groups are 
specifically identified and what are the mechanisms for reaching and incorporating 
them? 
2. Public disclosure: For projects that commit to public disclosure, are specific 
mechanisms for the disclosure detailed? Does the project commit to frequency of 
public dissemination activities or explain exactly what will be shared? 
3. Funding for CE: Has the project allocated funds to support citizen engagement 
commitments? 
 
Using this two-tiered approach to quantitative and qualitative analysis, ARC then determines 
the degree to which a World Bank project’s commitments to engaging citizens throughout its 
lifecycle add up to a strategic approach which, if implemented, could tangibly contribute to 
enabling empowered and empowering citizen action and/or accountable institutional 
responses.   
 
 
2  World Bank commitments to citizen 
engagement in investment projects: 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan (FY15–17) 
This section of the report presents the results of the individual country portfolio analyses for 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan.7 The discussion highlights the overall CE 
trends in project design, examining these four pilot cases together and compared to one 
another. First, the analysis will explore the country-level results, depicting the density of CE 
commitments by country and CE area. Second, the analysis will delve more deeply into the 
findings related to a selection of World Bank prioritised CE areas and each of the three ARC 
identified mechanisms that can contribute to an enabling environment for CE. 
 
2.1 Overall citizen engagement results  
2.1.1 The density of CE commitments in Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan 
As described in the introduction, thick approaches to CE commitments combine a project’s 
inclusion of the various CE activities laid out in the Bank’s strategy with mechanisms or 
practices that potentially contribute to an enabling environment for CE. ARC’s original CE 
density scale establishes parameters for understanding the variations of thickness and 
thinness in project CE commitments (see Table 1.1). The density is determined based on the 
existence of commitments, not an interpretation of the quality/lack of quality of the 
commitment. As discussed in more depth in section 1.5.2, the determination of where a 
project ranks is based on a balance between planned CE mechanisms and contributions 
towards an enabling environment for CE and is not simply based on an absolute total of 
CE + EE commitments. The CE density scale classifies the range of CE commitments into 
                                                          
7  This assessment focuses on IPFs, the focus of the World Bank’s CE corporate mandate, but it includes one program-
for-results (P4R) operation. P4Rs differs from IPFs because in principal financing is dedicated to a client country’s own 
development programme rather than an autonomous World Bank project (i.e. IFPs provide ‘funds for specific 
expenditures’ while P4Rs provide ‘funds for specific expenditure programs’ (World Bank 2012: 3). Furthermore, P4R 
fund disbursement depends upon the achievement of agreed interim results (DLIs – a financing mechanism an 
increasing number of IPFs now use) and are not subject to social safeguard policies, but instead must undertake an 
Environmental and Social Systems Assessment (ESSA) (World Bank 2012: 23). Although the World Bank is not 
monitoring P4R operations as part of the corporate mandate, these operations are still of considerable concern to the 
public in borrowing countries. Since the World Bank has steadily increased its use of P4R financing since creating the 
instrument in 2012 it is important to also understand the opportunities (and/or obstacles) to CE that exist in P4R based 
operations and where relevant ARC includes P4R operations in the analysis. 
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five categories. From highest to lowest they are: robust, comprehensive, intermediate, weak 
and low. Figure 2.1 shows the combined results for Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan. 
 
Figure 2.1 CE commitment density scale – combined results for Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan FY15–17 (57 projects) 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Fifty-seven per cent of Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan projects (40 out of 57) 
rank in the top two categories of the CE density scale, meaning that a slim majority of 
projects use a range of mechanisms at multiple points throughout their lifecycle and thereby 
demonstrate a thick commitment to comprehensive community engagement. The breakdown 
of the rankings are: robust (47 per cent or 25 projects), comprehensive (10 per cent or 7 
projects), intermediate (27 per cent or 15 projects), weak (11 per cent or 7 projects), and low 
(6 per cent or 3 projects). These results show that these 57 projects from four countries are 
distributed across the five levels of the scale, but that a plurality (47 per cent) occupy the top 
category. This plurality becomes a majority – albeit narrow – when the robust and 
comprehensive categories are combined. Projects in the comprehensive category do not 
meet all of the possible benchmarks, but meet at least seven of the ten. To qualify for the 
second highest category, projects with only five out of the seven possible CE mechanisms 
must have all three enabling environment commitments.  
 
There are 43 per cent of the projects in the lowest three categories, meaning that a sizeable 
minority have thin commitments to citizen engagement. Just over a quarter of the projects 
fall into the middle category, ‘intermediate’. These projects give some attention to citizen 
engagement, including in most cases to fostering an enabling environment, but fewer 
aspects have been addressed.  Finally, just under a fifth of the projects (ten) rank as weak or 
low. This is a minority of projects, but still a substantial percentage that have no more than 
four total CE commitments and could have no enabling environment commitments.  
 
To better understand this distribution, it is important to see how each country portfolio ranks 
on the CE Density Scale. Figure 2.2 shows how the countries compare to one another. 
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Figure 2.2 CE commitment density scale – four country comparison 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Given the minimal mandates the World Bank has imposed on projects – a single CE 
mechanism and CE indicator, the results of the CE density scale for these four portfolios can 
be interpreted as positive.  At the country level, at least 50 per cent of projects in all four 
countries are ranked in the top two categories. In Mozambique, Myanmar and Nigeria, at 
least 50 per cent of projects are ranked at the highest level. Pakistan is an outlier among 
these four countries, falling below the other three with just over a quarter (27 per cent) of 
total projects meeting the robust criteria, which explains why the robust ranking average for 
all four countries is below 50 per cent. Yet Pakistan meets the 50 per cent mark when 
including ’comprehensive’. Adding the comprehensive level then encompasses almost two-
thirds of the Mozambique and Nigeria portfolios.  
 
However, as many as a half (Myanmar and Pakistan) and at least a third (Mozambique and 
Nigeria) of projects across all four portfolios are ranked as intermediate or lower. In all four 
countries there is a notable number of projects that are missing CE and enabling 
environment commitments.  
 
On balance, the CE density scale results provide a positive more than a negative picture of 
how this sample of World Bank projects have committed to incorporating CE into project 
design. However, all four country portfolios show room for improvement. Mozambique 
stands out in a positive way because not only does it have more than 50 per cent in the top 
category, none of its projects fall into the bottom category. 
 
Table 2.1 shows how each of the projects in the FY15–17 Myanmar portfolio commit to the 
range of CE and EE areas. To see these details for Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan refer 
to the Annexe. 
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Table 2.1 CE overview by project, Myanmar portfolio FY15–17 (in descending order) 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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National Community 
Driven Development FY15 
400 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Essential Health Services 
Access FY15 
100 IP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Agricultural Development 
Support FY15 
100 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Flood and Landslide 
Emergency Recovery 
FY17 
200 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 2 
National Electrification 
FY16 
400 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 5 2 
Ayeyarwady Integrated 
River Basin Management 
FY15 
100 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No 5 1 
Southeast Asia Disaster 
Risk Management FY17 
130 IR Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No 5 1 
Financial Sector 
Development FY17 
100 None No No No No No No Yes No No No 1 0 
Total commitments  7 7 7 7 5 7 4 7 7 5 3   
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2.1.2 Overall results by CE area 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 showcase each of the CE areas, showing how many of the projects in 
the portfolio include each CE mechanism/activity from the greatest to the fewest. Figure 2.3 
focuses on the seven CE areas prioritised in the World Bank’s CE strategy while Figure 2.4 
highlights the ARC-identified indicators that potentially can foster an enabling environment 
for CE. As with the CE density scale ranking, the portfolio level analysis reports only on the 
existence of commitments and not their quality. The exploration by CE and enabling 
environment areas demonstrates the range of commitment incorporation. A discussion on 
the depth of said commitments will follow in the next section.  
 
Figure 2.3 Total commitments to World Bank prioritised CE areas across the four 
countries (57 total projects) 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Eighty per cent of projects (45 out of 57) commit to at least four of the CE areas prioritised by 
the World Bank. The top areas include: community-level consultation during design, 
grievance redress mechanisms, citizen feedback during implementation, and citizen 
engagement monitoring indicators in projects’ result frameworks. As explained in the 
introduction, community consultation in design differs from the other areas because it 
represents what projects report as already having accomplished versus commitments to 
what should take place during implementation.  
 
At the portfolio level, projects display the most commitments (91 per cent) to community 
consultation during design and establishing a project specific GRM. These findings align with 
IEG, which also found citizen consultation during design and project-level GRMs as having 
the highest number of commitments across the sample evaluated (World Bank 2018: 14) 
Seventy per cent of the projects (40 of 57) commit to going beyond seeking input from 
citizens and involving them in some aspect of project decision-making. Capacity building for 
CE and citizen M&E are the categories with the fewest commitments, both with about only 50 
per cent of assessed projects committing to them (31 and 30 out of 57 respectively). 
 
Twenty-three per cent of projects do not fulfil the World Bank’s minimum corporate 
requirement to include at least one CE activity and at least one CE indicator in project 
design. Seven projects (12 per cent) do not include any citizen engagement activities at all, 
whilst 12 projects (20 per cent) do not adopt any indicators to monitor aspects of citizen 
engagement during their lifecycle.   
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Having explored the comparative trends across the four countries for the World Bank CE 
priority areas, the analyses now moves on to the three indicators identified by ARC as 
potentially facilitating an enabling environment for CE. Figure 2.4 presents these 
commitments. 
 
Figure 2.4 Total commitments to mechanisms for an enabling environment for CE, 
across the four countries 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
The results show that substantially more projects commit to facilitating social inclusion and 
hiring third-party monitors than to public information disclosure. Across all four countries, 87 
per cent of the assessed projects (50 of the 57) committed to at least one activity designed to 
increase the inclusion of different types of stakeholders and beneficiaries in CE activities. 
This broad indicator only tracks if a project includes at least one mechanism for social 
inclusion and does not account for which groups are covered or how they will be included. 
Therefore, for this indicator in particular, an analysis of the content of the commitment is 
essential to discern the extent to which a project is engaging societal groups that are 
commonly excluded from participation.  
 
Third-party monitoring commitments come second after proactive social inclusion while 
proactive information disclosure is last. Eighty-seven per cent of projects (48 out of 57) 
document plans to arrange for third-party agencies to be involved in various aspects of 
project monitoring, evaluation and oversight. This means that for a large majority of projects 
there will be an external entity responsible for monitoring an aspect of project operations.  
 
In contrast to the project commitments to social inclusion and external monitoring, only 
slightly above 50 per cent (31 out of 57) projects documented intentions to proactively 
disclose information. Therefore, almost a half of the projects lack commitments to sharing 
project information beyond the minimum World Bank mandates. 
 
2.1.3 Social safeguards and CE findings 
As explained in the introduction above, when World Bank projects trigger social safeguard 
policies relating to indigenous peoples (Operational Policy OP/Bank Procedure (BP) 4.10) 
and/or involuntary resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), they are required to include two kinds of CE 
mechanisms: consultations during project design and GRMs that should be operational 
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during project implementation.8 Furthermore, social safeguard policy requires that the 
community-based consultation proceedings be documented and disclosed via publications in 
both English and any official national languages (which are then shared in live presentations 
to audiences of invited stakeholders). Given the disclosure requirements, the published 
documentation of these safeguard required consultations was included among the project 
documents reviewed for this analysis. Therefore, it is relevant to track the overlap between 
projects with these two kinds of CE commitments and those that have triggered one or both 
of the social safeguards. Figure 2.5 below depicts the number of projects in each country 
portfolio that applied social safeguards.  
 
Figure 2.5 Project-level application of social safeguards (FY15–17) across all four 
countries 
  
 
 
  
Source: Authors’ own. 
                                                          
8  Social safeguard policy requirements go beyond these two kinds of citizen engagement mechanisms. For example, 
resettlement policy requires compensation and the consideration of alternative investments that would minimise 
displacement. 
     
   
Pakistan 
Nigeria Mozambique 
Myanmar 
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Across the four countries, 29 of the 57 projects (51 per cent) apply at least one of the World 
Bank’s social safeguard policies.9 When these social safeguard results are cross-referenced 
with the CE results for citizen consultation during design and/or GRMs (91 per cent), the 
share of projects with commitments to these two CE areas goes significantly beyond those 
required by the safeguards. This finding at first glance could be a positive indication that 
projects are aiming for more than minimal compliance. 
 
The World Bank’s social safeguard mandates pre-dated the CE strategy and President Kim’s 
increased attention to these issues. In principle they are seen as strengthening incentives for 
implementing certain CE activities in projects applying social safeguards. However, as noted 
in the World Bank’s 2014 CE strategy, the triggering of social safeguards in practice mean 
that these ‘required’ CE activities are carried out well or in full, or reported on as expected 
(World Bank 2014: 133–34). Therefore, it remains critical to investigate what the CE 
commitments actually include, even while recognising the additional mandate that the 
application of social safeguards is assumed to add.  
 
2.2 In-depth analysis: World Bank prioritised CE areas 
In the following section the discussion moves beyond the identification of the range of CE 
commitments and analyses the content as expressed in programme design documents. The 
discussion will proceed according to select World Bank CE priority areas, including citizen 
collaboration in decision-making, citizen feedback collection, citizen monitoring, GRMs and 
CE indicators. The discussion continues with a focus on the three ARC identified indicators 
of an enabling environment for CE, proactive social inclusion, third-party monitoring and 
proactive information disclosure. Where relevant, the discussion draws on particular projects 
from the four countries that have committed to undertaking activities in those respective 
areas. 
 
2.2.1 Commitments to citizen/beneficiary collaboration in decision-making and 
collecting feedback from citizens 
The CE strategy delineates three distinct categories of CE, consultation during preparation, 
collaboration in decision making during implementation, and citizen feedback collection 
which guides how the CE areas are considered in the assessment. This discussion will focus 
on two of these categories, collaboration in decision-making and citizen feedback collection. 
Collaboration in decision-making is intended to go beyond consultations that seek out input 
to processes that integrate citizens directly into decision-making. The CE strategy explains 
that this process seeks to ‘make decisions more responsive to citizens’ needs and improve 
the sustainability of program and project outcomes through increased ownership by citizens’ 
(Manroth 2014: 43–144). 
 
Collection of citizen feedback, or what the CE strategy categorises as collecting, recording, 
and reporting on inputs from citizens, pertains to the periodic solicitation of feedback from 
project affected peoples during project implementation on a vast range of issues important to 
project success. According to the CE strategy these include, ‘effectiveness, inclusiveness, 
quality, delivery time, transaction costs, and targeting, as well as on resource utilization or 
engagement processes’ (Manroth 2014: 43–44).  
                                                          
9  It is important to note that of the four countries studied, only Myanmar applies the indigenous peoples safeguard and 
does so for projects that affect (or are determined likely to affect) the country’s legally categorised ethnic minorities. The 
legal systems in Mozambique, Nigeria and Pakistan do not recognise the existence of indigenous peoples; therefore, 
under the World Bank’s safeguard framework that applies to projects during the period studied, only the classification of 
possible involuntary resettlement could potentially be applied in these three countries. In Myanmar, several of the 
projects assessed applied both social safeguards. This does not mean that projects are guaranteed to be involuntarily 
resettling people, but that there is a potential chance that this could occur. For more information on the World Bank’s 
safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement, see http://go.worldbank.org/TRLT2MQSX0. 
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This review found that these categories do not consistently represent the terminology that 
project teams use in programme documents to describe CE commitments. Often projects 
employ the term ‘consultation’ when describing both consultative meetings that have the 
purpose of gathering input for project teams to make the final decisions versus participatory 
exercises that allow citizens to be involved in decision-making themselves. Therefore, the 
context in the programme documents was key to determining the kind of citizen engagement 
activity the project committed to carrying out. 
 
Given the potential overlap between collaborative decision-making and feedback collection, 
the two areas will be presented with their findings and then examined together. Figure 2.6 
displays the collaboration in decision-making results for FY15–17 in the four countries.  
 
Figure 2.6 Collaboration in decision-making 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
The four country portfolios show a strong commitment to collaborative decision-making, with 
40 out of 57 projects (70 per cent) committing to this. The in-country comparison indicates 
that, in terms of percentage of project portfolio, Mozambique and Myanmar demonstrate 
greater commitments than Nigeria and Pakistan to directly involving citizens in decision-
making. In Mozambique and Myanmar, an overwhelming majority of projects within each 
country committed to creating such decision-making opportunities for at least some 
beneficiaries (81 per cent and 87.5 per cent respectively). Nigeria, at 75 per cent has a lower 
percentage commitment than Myanmar and Mozambique, but this still represents a majority 
of its 16 projects. Pakistan has the same number of projects (12) as Nigeria that commit to 
offering community members some decision-making opportunities, but its portfolio is 30 per 
cent larger. 
 
Commitments to stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes vary by the nature of 
projects and by countries. Many projects indicate that they plan to engage with and include a 
wide range of project affected peoples, from individual beneficiaries to representatives of 
community-based organisations, in project decisions. For example, in the Cities and Climate 
Change project for Climate Resilience of Mozambique (2015), street vendors whose 
businesses may be affected by project plans for climate mitigation are identified for direct 
involvement in decision-making. However, a majority of projects document planned 
mechanisms for collaboration without clarifying the issues upon which the communities will 
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decide, where the community engagement will take place, and when the co-planning will 
happen during a project cycle. Table 2.2 juxtaposes projects from Mozambique and 
Myanmar. 
 
Table 2.2 Collaborative decision-making in two projects, Mozambique and Myanmar 
Mozambique 
Agriculture and Natural Resources Landscape 
project (FY16) 
Myanmar 
Flood and Landslide Emergency Recovery project 
(FY17) 
Commitment: Community-based organisations to 
create land-use plans to feed into relevant district 
and provincial level spatial planning activities. 
 
Mechanism: 
● Participatory planning. 
Possible mechanisms (to be decided during 
implementation): 
● Community meetings (to inform design, 
construction, maintenance); 
● Focus group discussions; 
● Participatory planning exercises;  
● Awareness building about project with 
communities. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
These two examples from Mozambique and Myanmar, the two countries with the highest 
percentage of commitments on collaborative decision-making by portfolio, show the 
discrepancies that can exist in the details provided for a commitment under this category. In 
Mozambique, the Agriculture and Natural Resources Landscape project provides specifics 
about the content of the intended collaboration, outlining that land-use plans will be created 
by community-based organisations at district and provincial levels. Information about the 
mechanisms for carrying out these plans are more limited, however, explained only as taking 
place via participatory planning. Meanwhile, the Flood and Landslide Emergency Recovery 
project in Myanmar showcases a more comprehensive list of potential mechanisms to give 
community members opportunities to direct and determine project activities. However the 
project does not specify the subject matters that communities could decide upon or the 
stages at which community decision-making would take place. 
 
Figure 2.7 depicts commitments to collecting citizen feedback during implementation across 
the four assessed countries. 
 
Figure 2.7 Commitments to collecting citizen feedback, by country  
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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All four country portfolios exhibit a high level of commitment to incorporating citizen feedback 
mechanisms throughout project implementation, with 85 per cent of all assessed projects 
(49 out of 57) committing to this CE indicator. At the highest level is Pakistan, the largest 
portfolio, with all of its 22 projects documenting citizen feedback commitments. At the lowest, 
lies Mozambique, with only 6 of its 11 projects having this commitment.  
 
Qualitative analysis shows that, within this category, projects commit to collecting citizen 
feedback both periodically and on an ongoing basis using a wide range of tools. Periodic 
feedback collection, which depends on the project initiating the opportunity, is the most 
common kind of commitment. The most frequently cited mechanisms include: 
satisfaction/opinion surveys, citizen report cards, focus groups, and public meetings. 
However, a majority of projects do not provide details about the frequency of opportunities for 
citizen feedback. The Pakistan portfolio includes two exceptions to this: the Balochistan 
Integrated Water Resources Management and Development (2016) commits to 
implementing a satisfaction survey every two years, while the Tarbela 4th Extension 
Hydropower 2017 AF commits to carrying out an annual beneficiary feedback survey.   
 
A quarter of all analysed projects (13 out of 49) committed to ICT-based feedback 
opportunities. The Nigeria portfolio stands out by offering the highest number of ICT based 
feedback opportunities in seven projects, via plans for virtual platforms, email, phones, and 
social media. Pakistan follows with five projects listing web-based platforms and cell phones 
as some of the tools to collect community feedback. Myanmar promoted the use of ICT-
based tools without giving specifics, while there was no mention of these mechanisms in 
Mozambique. 
 
Despite the fact that projects clearly state commitments to collecting citizen feedback during 
implementation, there is both a wide variation in how they document the types of feedback 
they plan to collect, the mechanisms to be used, and the level of detail explaining how the 
commitments will be executed. The table below features two projects, one from the 
Mozambique and the other from Nigeria to demonstrate the differences in detail and 
specificity project documents offer on the kinds of commitments, their goals, and the 
mechanisms to be used. 
 
Table 2.3 Citizen feedback collection and reporting in example projects, Mozambique 
and Nigeria, FY15–17 
Mozambique 
Water Services and Institutional Support II project 
(FY16) 
Nigeria 
Mineral Sector Support for Economic 
Diversification project (FY17) 
Commitment:   
● To assessing implementation, service quality, 
satisfaction with new water connections, and 
household perceptions/valuation of the new 
water service, which focuses on the degree of 
engagement and feedback from service users;  
● To implementing ‘Citizen Voice’ tools in project 
cities (which will be measured in results 
framework).  
 
Mechanisms:  
● Collecting qualitative data from households 
● Beneficiary score-cards 
● Survey in the results framework. 
Commitment:  
● To on-going stakeholder and public 
consultation. 
 
Mechanisms:  
● Meetings 
● Radio programmes 
● Requests for written comments 
● Questionnaires 
● Interviews 
● Focus groups. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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The Water Services and Institutional Support II project in Mozambique showcases the most 
detailed and nuanced commitments to citizen feedback collection across all 57 projects 
analysed. The project documents extremely specific goals for collecting citizen feedback, 
going beyond user satisfaction with service provision (the focus of the project) and including 
perceptions of implementation process and households’ overall value of the service for their 
lives. The list of mechanisms for collecting feedback is brief (only three mechanisms 
documented), yet they appear to be tailored to meet each of the specified goals. This 
information provides the basis for project observers to track if and how the commitment is 
being carried out.  
 
In contrast, the highlighted project in Nigeria, Mineral Sector Support for Economic 
Diversification, includes a comprehensive list of six different mechanisms for gathering 
beneficiary opinions, ranging from written feedback opportunities to public meetings. Yet the 
project’s extremely generic commitment to ‘on-going stakeholder and public consultation’, 
makes it unclear as to how this range of mechanisms would be used solicit feedback and 
inform implementation progress. These two examples demonstrate how ticking the check 
box for this category of CE might not guarantee that the commitment is adequate to gather 
feedback from communities in a way that can meaningfully contribute to the project. 
 
2.2.2 Commitments to involving citizens in project monitoring 
According to the CE strategy, involving citizens in project monitoring ‘can increase 
transparency, improve efficiency of service delivery or budget execution, and reduce 
opportunities for corruption’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 47). Participation in project monitoring in 
areas such as service delivery, revenue intake, budget execution, procurement, contract 
awards, and the roll out of reform policies can leverages citizens’ roles so they contribute 
beyond mere feedback provision. The role provides citizens with both an independent 
verification role and allows a sub-set of the project affected population access to the big 
picture of project performance and service provision, as well as providing beneficiary 
reactions to the implemented programmes. Figure 2.8 displays the results for the four 
countries assessed. 
 
Figure 2.8 Citizen monitoring commitment results, FY15–17 across the four countries 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Citizen monitoring represents the CE area with fewest commitments at project level across 
the four assessed countries, only 30 of the 57 projects (53 per cent) report a commitment to 
including at least one form of citizen oversight. Nigeria shows the highest percentage (75 per 
cent) with this commitment, while Pakistan, despite having the biggest portfolio, has only 
30 per cent of projects committed to this CE area.  
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The definition as well as the roles of who will monitor the implementation of activities that will 
benefit direct beneficiaries or have some kind of impact on indirect beneficiaries is still 
unclear. There is variation in the articulation of the type of community-based stakeholders 
projects commit to involving. At one end, approximately one-third (9 out of 30) explicitly state 
the intention to give CSOs, CBOs and NGOs responsibility for an aspect of project oversight. 
It is not made clear, however, if these organisations would encompass affected community 
members, which means the role of citizens as monitors is still questionable. At the other end, 
one-third (ten) provide no details about the type of community-based stakeholders that would 
be offered the opportunity to participate in monitoring project implementation.   
 
‘Participatory M&E’ is a common way that projects express their intentions to give citizens a 
role in monitoring activities. What mechanisms will be used to facilitate this participation, 
remains ambiguous. A number of the assessed projects across the four countries report 
similar plans or mechanisms of adopting assessments and evaluations to engage citizens in 
oversight. Some projects list more detailed initiatives such as a national forest forum (Forest 
Investment project FY17 in Mozambique) or using an ICT-based tool (Water Services and 
Institutional Support II in Mozambique), although not detailing the kind of tool.  
 
To provide a comparative example from one of the country portfolios, Table 2.4 illustrates the 
extent to which several Mozambique projects commit to citizen monitoring. No single project 
mentions all aspects of the commitment from what to monitor, to who will monitor, what the 
roles are, and how to monitor. Thus, there is still a big gap between beneficiary-led 
monitoring and monitoring initiatives led by project implementers, in which beneficiaries 
collaborate.  
 
Table 2.4 Examples of CE monitoring across three Mozambique projects 
Social Protection project – 
AF (FY17) 
Water Services and Institutional 
Support II (FY16) 
Forest Investment project  
(FY17) 
Commitment: Participatory 
monitoring during programme 
implementation. 
 
Who: Community leaders. 
 
Mechanisms: Unspecified. 
Commitment: Local quality-of-service 
and financial regulatory mechanisms to 
enforce and monitor local regulation; 
local regulatory commissions called 
CORALs (Comissoes Reguladoras 
Locais). 
 
Also commits to decentralising ‘some 
aspects’ of regulatory oversight to 
customers. 
 
Who: Unspecified. 
 
Mechanisms: CORALs; local ICT 
instruments. 
Commitment: Promotes citizen 
engagement in a National 
Forest Forum and regular and 
participatory evaluation of the 
forest sector.  
 
Who: Unspecified. 
 
Mechanisms: a National Forest 
Forum; participatory 
evaluations. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
In terms of the monitoring responsibilities that citizens would have, only 40 per cent (12 out 
of 30 projects) outlined clearly the kind of activities or components to be monitored. Where 
stated, they include involving citizens in monitoring regulatory compliance, budget and 
contract awards, service delivery, construction, and project performance and progress. The 
remaining 60 per cent only document plans for participatory M&E, but without specifying how 
it will take place and what responsibilities citizen monitors might have.  
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2.2.3 Commitments to implementing GRMs 
As specified in the introduction (see section 1.3), this analysis differentiates project-specific 
GRMs, which are intended to be contextually relevant to the project in design and 
functionality, from the institutional-level Grievance Redress Service (GRS), administered by 
World Bank management. In principle, project-specific GRMs serve a dual purpose. On the 
one hand, they are meant to act as a complaint handling mechanism through which project 
affected peoples can raise concerns, queries or clarifications related to project 
implementation. On the other hand, they should provide the channels through which reported 
complaints and grievances are addressed and resolved. The CE strategy recognises that in 
many projects, GRMs are not operationalised. In fact, the strategy cites findings from the 
World Bank’s 2014 GRM review which found that, ‘of projects that commit to creating GRMs 
in design, 40 per cent do not end up creating one in practice’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 45). To 
address these operational concerns, the CE strategy lays out GRM best practices that 
include: ‘providing multiple channels for soliciting complaints; registering complaints in a log; 
publishing timely and service standards for acknowledgement, response, and resolution; and 
ensuring transparency about the grievance procedure as well as options for mediation and 
appeal’ (Manroth et al. 2014: 46).  
 
As discussed in section 3.1.3, World Bank IFPs that apply either of the two social safeguard 
policies (for indigenous peoples and/or involuntary resettlement) are mandated to incorporate 
GRMs into project implementation. However, a GRM only narrowly developed for social 
safeguards compliance will not necessarily be available to the entirety of populations 
considered to be beneficiaries or affected. These regulations will be considered in the 
forthcoming analysis of findings. Figure 2.9 depicts the documented commitments to 
implementing project-specific GRMs across the four countries.  
 
Figure 2.9 Commitments to implementing GRMs, by country 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
A large majority of the projects (91 per cent or 52 projects) committed to creating project-
specific GRMs. Pakistan topped this commitment at 95 per cent (21 out of 22 projects), 
followed by Mozambique at 91 per cent (10 out of 11 projects), then both Myanmar and 
Nigeria at 88 per cent (7 out of 8 projects in Myanmar and 14 out of 16 projects in Nigeria). 
Within these 52 projects, 33 (10 in Pakistan, 10 in Mozambique, 7 in Myanmar and 6 in 
Nigeria) involved (or potentially involved) social safeguards for involuntary resettlement 
and/or indigenous peoples. It is important to highlight this, given the IFP policies that require 
projects applying social safeguards to incorporate project-specific GRMs. The remaining 
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19 projects did not trigger social safeguards, but proactively committed to creating a project-
specific mechanism through which project affected peoples could submit complaints and 
expect redress. 
 
Findings from the assessment show that most of the projects that commit to GRMs, plan for 
the same authorities implementing the project to manage the GRM processes and results. 
When GRMs are overseen by the same authorities that manage the project, citizen 
complaints are likely to be received by those individuals/organisations that could be 
responsible for the problems or concerns. This does not necessarily suggest that complaints 
will not be pursued responsibly or that the results are questionable. Nevertheless, the lack of 
separation between project management and GRM management may potentially dissuade 
people from using the mechanisms and can reduce trust in the reported results even when 
they are publicly disclosed. These findings are therefore significant because they raise a 
conflict of interest concern for those tasked with managing GRMs. 
 
Given the lack of independent monitoring of GRM operations and how often planned GRMs 
are not fully carried out, the assessment tracked the frequency with which projects committed 
to disclosing their GRM results. The proactive disclosure of GRM data increases the 
possibilities for communities to hold projects accountable for this commitment. Figure 2.10 
shows the distribution of the commitments to create a project-specific GRM correlated with 
commitments to disclose the GRM results.  
 
Figure 2.10 Comparison of GRM commitments and GRM disclosure commitments 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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While commitments to incorporating GRMs are very high across all four countries, the 
commitments to making GRM results available to the public are extremely low. Of the 52 
projects that include a GRM commitment, only 16 document an intention to share results with 
the public. Less than half of Nigeria’s projects (five) commit to publicly reporting on aspects 
of their GRM: through the use of results framework indicators (RFIs) in four projects, and 
voluntary disclosure in the other. In Myanmar only three projects (38 per cent) commit to 
disclosing GRM related information: two projects using RFIs and one project through 
voluntary disclosure. In Pakistan roughly a third (seven) commit to disclosing GRM results: 
six through RFIs, and one – National Immunization Support – through voluntary disclosure. 
Only one project in Mozambique – Social Protection AF uses RFI to publicly report on its 
GRM related activities.  
 
Table 2.5 shows the only three projects committed to voluntarily disclosing their GRM data 
outside of their results framework. 
 
Table 2.5 Commitments to publicly disclosing GRM data beyond limited RFI 
monitoring indicators   
Myanmar 
National Community Driven 
Development Project (FY15) 
Nigeria  
Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery 
Project for NE Nigeria (FY17) 
Pakistan 
National Immunization Support 
(FY16) 
Commitment in operational manual 
(which is publicly available) to 
produce reports on GRM results 
and publicly disseminate them. 
Commitment to public disclosure 
of Biannual report of all 
complaints received via GRM 
and actions taken. 
Commitment in Environment 
Assessment to sharing some GRM 
results but mechanism not 
specified. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
These findings show a significant discrepancy between project commitments adopting GRMs 
and publicising any information about the mechanism. Disclosing GRM results – whether 
through the World Bank’s RFI structure or other means – enables the public and project 
beneficiaries to understand the difficulties faced by the project and how the challenges are 
resolved. For instance, in Mozambique, 10 of the 11 projects commit to creating a GRM, but 
only the Social Protection project AF will disclose GRM information related to complaints 
received and/or resolved. This raises questions about how accountable complaint handling 
processes will actually be and if and/or how citizens would be informed in a timely and 
appropriate manner about problems that arise. Thus, across the majority of projects, it will be 
extremely difficult to track whether the high commitment numbers to GRM translate into 
actual opportunities for citizen engagement (i.e. if projects in fact operate functioning and 
accessible complaint redress systems), if actions are taken to resolve the complaints, and if 
these actions actually resolve them. 
 
 40 
 
Box 2.1 Results framework indicators (RFIs) designed to capture data about project-
specific GRMs 
Of the 52 projects across the four countries that commit to implementing a project-specific 
GRM, 13 created RFIs to track results. The aspects of the GRM covered in these 
indicators fall into four main categories: 
 
1. Timelines refers to complaints attended to within the specified timeframe. For 
example, percentage of grievances attended to per time stipulated in the operational 
manual (OM). Sometimes, the timespan is listed – 60 days in the case of the FATA 
temporarily displaced persons emergency recovery project in Pakistan – but most 
often the RFI just says ‘timeliness of response’ without defining timelines, or that 
‘timeliness’ will be spelled out in the OM which is not available to the public. Most 
RFIs for GRM are related to timelines. 
2. Beneficiary satisfaction reports on the level of satisfaction of respondents with the 
GRM – on issues of transparency, timelines, and actual resolution. For example the 
RFI for the National social safety nets project AF in Nigeria measures the percentage 
of complains satisfactorily addressed within three months of the initial complaint 
being recorded. 
3. Number or percentage of addressed/resolved complaints (or percentage 
increase). The resolution of complaints is tracked in absolute numbers or 
percentages with a targeted goal which spans 75–95 per cent. For example, the 
Southeast Asia disaster risk management project in Myanmar RFI tracks the 
percentage of registered grievances addressed (the target being 85 per cent). 
4. The number of GRMs set up relates to complaint mechanisms launched at project 
sites. Only one project in Mozambique – the Social Protection Project AF – records 
the percentage of districts with a GRM (along with the number of complaints handled 
in a timely manner). 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
2.2.4 Commitments to monitoring CE results in project results frameworks 
The CE strategy emphasises the importance of creating dedicated monitoring indicators that 
will measure CE activity progress and performance, and the corporate commitment for 
citizen engagement requires projects to do this for at least one CE mechanism. The interim 
and final outcomes measured by RFIs must be reported on to management and made public 
via the World Bank’s online operations portal. This means that CE indicators offer one of the 
few instances in which information about CE in World Bank projects is required to be 
disclosed. Therefore, this section discusses the following: are projects meeting this minimum 
corporate requirement? If so, what CE areas do projects commit to monitoring in their results 
frameworks? Do projects go beyond the minimum requirement to evaluate CE across more 
than a single area? 
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Figure 2.11 Monitoring indicators for CE, by country 
        
    
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Over two-thirds of the assessed projects (45 out of 57) meet the minimum corporate 
requirement by the World Bank to include at least one RFI to measure the extent of citizen 
engagement. Myanmar and Mozambique have the highest percentages, with all projects 
except for one in each portfolio meeting the minimum requirement. However, when 
investigating commitments to two or more CE indicators, Myanmar has the lowest 
percentage among the four countries. In Pakistan, only 73 per cent (16 out of 22) of projects 
pledge to incorporating at least one CE RFI, however of those projects half demonstrated 
commitments to including at least two CE RFIs. 
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Figure 2.12 Monitoring indicators for CE, by area 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Collecting citizen feedback is the CE area projects most frequently select to monitor and 
disclose through their results frameworks, with more than 62 per cent of committed projects 
(28 out of 45) developing a CE indicator to measure progress in this area. Only 30 per cent 
and 18 per cent, respectively, of the committed projects have indicators measuring progress 
on GRMs and collaborative decision making. For GRMs, this percentage can be considered 
relatively low given that there are 33 projects across the four country portfolios that triggered 
social safeguards and 52 that commit to carrying out a GRM.  
 
Since the results framework is the primary way that projects disclose information about their 
CE activities and results, this low figure raises questions about how projects triggering social 
safeguards, and therefore required to implement GRMs, will actually be held accountable for 
complying with this policy. This finding aligns with the 2018 IEG investigation, which found a 
significant discrepancy between how commonly projects committed to adopting GRMS and 
yet how infrequently projects committed to measuring and reporting on the results (World 
Bank 2018c: xii). It is notable that no projects chose to adopt internal monitoring indicators to 
track the progress of citizen involvement in project monitoring, although 30 projects 
committed to this kind of CE activity.  
 
2.3 In-depth analysis: commitments to creating an enabling environment for CE  
This research is based on ARC’s hypothesis that a project’s inclusion of CE activities is not 
sufficient to guarantee meaningful engagement and therefore an ‘enabling environment’ is 
needed to facilitate and shape such engagement. Although individual projects do not have 
the power or influence to shape the general context in which they are implemented, they can 
take actions that potentially favourably or unfavourably contribute to an enabling 
environment. Therefore, the overall opportunity for CE is not only determined by the 
existence of discrete mechanisms and activities for citizens to provide input, make decisions, 
be involved in monitoring, etc., but also by the way in which these activities are carried out. 
Although not guaranteed, projects have the potential to influence these enabling 
circumstances in at least three ways: (1) by fostering social inclusion; (2) by promoting 
accountability through incorporating independent monitoring mechanisms; and (3) by 
promoting transparency through disclosure of project information. The discussion below 
covers the assessment of findings across these three areas. 
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2.3.1 Measures for proactive social inclusion in citizen engagement efforts 
Groups that have experienced social marginalisation and exclusion could be omitted from 
participatory processes unless there are proactive measures to enable or seek their 
engagement. Such potentially vulnerable groups include women, children and youth, people 
with disabilities, the elderly, ethnic and religious minorities, and migrants, among others. 
Therefore, the analysis investigates whether a project includes measures in its design that 
are intended to facilitate the participation of vulnerable groups (as is contextually relevant) in 
planned CE processes and to what extent. 
 
Out of the assessed projects, 50 or 88 per cent commit at least once in their project 
documents to proactively taking measures to ensure that citizen engagement efforts and 
activities are inclusive. Pakistan leads with all projects committing to proactive social 
inclusion, followed by Myanmar (88 per cent), Mozambique (82 per cent) and finally Nigeria 
(75 per cent). Figure 2.13 depicts the percentage of proactive social inclusion commitments 
across the four country portfolios. 
 
Figure 2.13 Proactive social inclusion commitments, by country 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Across all four countries, project commitments to proactive social inclusion prioritise 
engaging women and far less frequently document commitments to including other socially 
excluded groups. Not only is the number of commitments to gender inclusion higher, but 
these commitments also show greater depth and specificity. Figure 2.14 depicts the large 
gaps between the commitments to women’s inclusion vis-à-vis the inclusion of other 
population categories and the analysis that follows, highlights the main findings. 
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Figure 2.14 Proactive social inclusion commitments, by population group 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Women (gender) take precedence in proactive social inclusion commitments. An 
overwhelming majority (84 per cent or 48 projects) document commitments to secure ‘gender 
inclusion’ in their project design commonly demonstrated by instituting quotas or minimum 
percentages for women’s participation in CE activities. Examples include: minimum number 
of women members in community-based decision-making bodies, participants in CE capacity 
building workshops, or respondents to satisfaction surveys. Some projects also facilitate 
women’s inclusion by committing to offer women-only and women-led face to face 
consultation opportunities.   
 
A composite category that World Bank projects often refer to as ‘other vulnerable groups’ 
(OVG) is the next most commonly addressed group (35 per cent or 20 projects) for proactive 
social inclusion. The definition of OVG varies according to projects and sometimes it is used 
independently as a stand-alone category. This analysis uses the OVG categorisation to 
broadly encompass the poor, elderly, socially or economically excluded populations, 
landless, water groups, farmers, AIDS patients and the chronically ill. Only a third of the 
projects commit to including some or all sub-groups in the OVG category and lay out generic 
mechanisms outlining their inclusion that range from consultations to capacity building. 
 
In some cases, albeit far less frequently, projects go beyond the overarching OVG category 
to pledge commitments to specific marginalised groups as described below:  
 
Youth inclusion is addressed in 8 projects from Nigeria and Mozambique (none in Pakistan 
or Myanmar). Mozambique includes commitments to including youth in CE efforts in almost 
half of its projects (5 out of 11) while Nigeria does in just 3 of its 16 projects. Mozambique 
projects also document specific mechanisms for including youth.  
 
Commitments to including children are also in eight of the projects. Children, however, are 
rarely a stand-alone category and are mentioned along with women (mothers) as being 
recipients of project incentives, or targeted service delivery especially in projects pertaining 
to maternal or child health, for example the National Immunization Support and Enhanced 
Nutrition projects in Pakistan and the Polio project in Nigeria. Projects relating to education in 
Nigeria and Mozambique also address children (students). Myanmar does not document any 
commitments to proactively including children. 
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Only Myanmar consistently commits to including ethnic minorities and their representative 
organisations in citizen engagement processes in six of its eight projects. The World Bank’s 
policy in Myanmar of applying the indigenous people’s safeguard to projects affecting one or 
more of the country’s ethnic minority groups is the reason for this. Apart from Myanmar, only 
one project in Pakistan (Enhanced Nutrition for Mothers and Children), documents the 
inclusion of religious and ethnic minorities, but without any specific mechanisms. 
Mozambique and Nigeria, both of which have minority ethnicities within their population, do 
not have a single project that commits to their inclusion. 
 
People with disabilities is another category of socially excluded population that finds a 
mention in only 11 per cent or six projects. Pakistan is the only country with three projects 
that document inclusion measures for people with disabilities. Project mechanisms include 
supporting universal access to public spaces (Karachi Neighborhood Improvement project) 
and expanding proactive access to this population in emergencies (FATA Displaced Persons 
Emergency Recovery project and the Disaster and Climate Resilience Improvement project). 
Additionally, only one project in each of the other three countries has pledged a commitment 
to people with disabilities without listing specific mechanisms. 
 
Lastly, displaced people, IDPs or migrants were found to be included in the fewest project 
commitments (7 per cent or 4 projects). Only Nigeria has two projects that commit to 
proactively including these groups in their CE efforts, while Myanmar and Pakistan include 
them in one project each. As in case of most other marginalised groups, project documents 
simply name this group without detailing plans for their specific inclusion in activities. 
 
The main finding from this four-country analysis of commitments to proactive social inclusion 
reveals that the vast majority of projects (84 per cent) only incorporate mechanisms into 
project design facilitating women’s inclusion. In contrast, few projects commit to fostering the 
inclusion of often socially excluded or neglected groups like the disabled, displaced, poor, the 
elderly and youth. Furthermore are expressed in vague language, paling in comparison to 
the comprehensiveness of commitments to women’s inclusion. This shows that a single 
indicator measuring proactive inclusion may not be sufficient to interpret a project’s enabling 
environment for CE. 
 
2.3.2 Third-party monitoring commitments 
The World Bank defines third-party monitoring as, ‘monitoring by parties that are external to 
the project or program’s direct beneficiary chain or management structure’ (Van Wicklin and 
Gurkan 2013: 2). It recommends that projects incorporate third-party monitoring in order ‘to 
provide an independent perspective on project or government performance’ (Van Wicklin and 
Gurkan 2013: 2). Third-party monitoring in this case does not refer to external monitoring 
undertaken separately from the project, for example by watchdog organisations. Instead this 
refers to monitoring handled by entities outside of the project management structure, 
although likely funded by the project. It is because of the anticipated independence of these 
external monitoring entities, even when they are hired by the project, that the incorporation of 
third-party monitoring can potentially contribute to an enabling environment for citizen 
engagement.  
 
The ARC assessment tool identifies first whether a project commits to incorporating a third-
party monitoring entity (professional or community-based). If so, the assessment then 
ascertains the purpose for which the project plans to engage the entity (i.e. monitoring 
safeguard compliance, impact evaluation, collection of citizen feedback, etc.) and whether 
there is a documented intention to share findings with the public. These three steps are 
collectively considered to determine the potential contribution of third-party monitoring to an 
enabling environment.  
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The assessment revealed that projects commit to third-party monitoring for a range of 
activities and mechanisms. While some projects include commitment to third-party 
monitoring in just one area, many include multiple commitments across several areas during 
the project life cycle. The five broad categories of third-party monitoring include:  
 
1. Social Safeguard compliance for projects that have been determined to involve or 
have the potential to involve resettlement and/or indigenous peoples. 
2. Project M&E of general project processes, results and outcomes to accompany the 
project monitoring taken by PMUs. 
3. Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs) are project indicators whose achievement 
triggers the release of a new tranche of funds to continue project implementation. 
These are used by projects to incentivise the achievement of key programme 
milestones and improve performance. Because funding provision is linked directly with 
goal achievement, the World Bank requires that these indicators be monitored by 
external entities. Therefore, projects that incorporate DLIs rather than traditional project 
indicators are required to contract third-party monitoring. 
4. CE activity monitoring involves project supported or recruited external monitoring of 
the CE project activities and mechanisms designed to provide affected peoples with 
opportunities to provide feedback, make decisions, submit complaints (i.e. 
management of a project-level GRM by an entity separate from the PMU or the client 
government). 
5. Impact Evaluation determines if the changes in outcomes can be attributed to the 
project.   
 
The classification of these commitments overall and separated by country is illustrated in 
Figures 2.15 and 2.16, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.15 Categories of third-party monitoring commitments, overall (57 projects) 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Figure 2.16 Categories of third-party monitoring commitments, by country 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Nigeria leads with a commitment to one or more categories of third-party monitoring in all of 
its 16 projects. Pakistan comes a close second with an 86 per cent commitment in its 19 
projects. Mozambique and Myanmar follow with eight (73 per cent) and five (63 per cent) 
respectively. 
 
Within the five categories of third-party monitoring, commitments are found to be the highest 
for general project monitoring and evaluation (36 projects), followed by safeguards 
compliance (31 projects). Given the World Bank mandate that requires projects with DLIs to 
use external monitoring, it fits expectations that all 13 projects that incorporate DLIs include 
third-party monitoring to meet this requirement.   
 
When a project involves a third party to monitor and evaluate its CE activities, it adds an 
additional layer of transparency and accountability which may not be found in other projects. 
Yet, the analysis found that third-party monitoring of CE activities does not appear to be a 
priority, with only 28 per cent or 16 projects making a commitment to monitoring certain 
aspects of their CE efforts. Seven projects in Nigeria make the highest CE monitoring 
commitments, followed by four projects Pakistan, then three projects in Myanmar, and lastly 
two in Mozambique. A large majority of third-party monitoring involves some form of gauging 
satisfaction through beneficiary assessments, or monitoring quality and effectiveness of 
service delivery. Table 2.6 highlights some of these project commitments. 
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Table 2.6 Project commitments to CE activity third-party monitoring, by country 
Nigeria 
National Social Safety 
Nets project AF FY16 
Pakistan 
Punjab Skills 
Development project 
FY15 
Myanmar 
Essential Health Services 
Access project FY15 
Mozambique 
Water Services and 
Institutional Support II 
FY16 
Commitment: 
Independent third-party 
monitors (i.e. CSOs and 
specialised private firms) 
will collect feedback from 
beneficiaries on project 
performance (e.g 
transfers, quality of 
services, responsiveness 
to beneficiary challenges) 
and conduct spot checks.  
 
Who: CSOs and 
specialised private firms. 
 
What: Feedback 
collection on project 
performance; spot checks. 
Commitment: Specific 
third-party independent 
monitoring activities will 
be carried out to verify 
employer satisfaction 
surveys, third-party 
validations of enrolment 
and pass-out data, and 
employment tracer 
studies and regular 
monitoring of training 
providers.  
 
Who: Independent firm. 
 
What: Verification of 
employer satisfaction 
surveys, enrolment and 
pass-out data and 
employment tracer 
studies; monitoring of 
training providers.   
Commitment: Ministry of 
Health will contract an 
international firm to carry 
out an independent 
sample-based survey of 
filled checklists by the 
township and State 
teams to verify the 
results. Independent 
assessor may review all 
the township reports and 
visit randomly selected 
townships and health 
facilities at village level. 
 
Who: International firm 
contracted by Ministry of 
Health (MOH).  
 
What: Verify results 
through sample-based 
survey of filled checklists; 
review reports; visit select 
health facilities.  
Commitment: 
Independent Verification 
Agency will track 
indicators of service 
quality and socio-
economic characteristics 
and carry out beneficiary 
surveys as part of the 
poverty-focused 
activities. 
 
Who: Independent 
Verification Agency 
(IVA). 
 
What: Tracking 
indicators of service 
quality; conducting 
beneficiary surveys. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
It is worth noting that neither CE monitoring nor impact evaluations (to which nine projects 
commit), are mandatory requirements by the World Bank or project teams unlike monitoring 
of safeguards and DLIs. It is the onus of project teams to involve independent monitoring of 
CE activities and entails going above the minimum monitoring requirements stipulated by the 
World Bank. The next section on proactive information disclosure will discuss those projects 
that link third-party monitoring and disclosure commitments.  
 
2.3.3 Proactive (public) information disclosure 
Proactive information disclosure goes beyond efforts to make the public aware of a project’s 
existence and its intended impacts and refers to the public release of information about a 
range of issues including: project progress, outputs, monitoring and learning results, and 
outcomes. Recognising that the World Bank has minimal disclosure requirements for social 
safeguards and RFIs (as discussed earlier in this section), this indicator therefore measures 
whether and how a project commits to proactively releasing project results to the public, 
including from citizen engagement efforts, beyond the mandated minimum. As a result, this 
indicator seeks to determine if a project commits to ‘reporting out’ its progress and results to 
the public rather than only ‘reporting up’ to World Bank officials and if so, how. This is a 
crucial aspect of the enabling environment for CE because the capacity of project affected 
peoples to shape a project increases when they are accurately and appropriately informed 
about its progress. 
 
Slightly more than half (31 of 57) of the assessed projects commit to proactive disclosure of 
progress and results. Of the three enabling environment areas, proactive information 
disclosure has the fewest project commitments. Comparing the four countries, Pakistan has 
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the highest proportion of projects (64 per cent) committing to proactively reporting to the 
public about progress and results. Mozambique has this commitment in 55 per cent of its 
projects, followed by Nigeria with 50 per cent, and then Myanmar at 38 per cent.  
 
Figure 2.17 demonstrates the mechanisms for proactive information disclosure adopted in 
each of the four countries and Figure 2.18 presents the total distribution of these 
mechanisms across the 57 projects. 
 
Figure 2.17 Proactive information disclosure mechanisms, by country 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Figure 2.18 Overall distribution of proactive disclosure mechanisms 
  
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Websites or web portals are the most frequently cited mechanism for public information 
disclosure (9 out of the 31 projects with a public disclosure commitment). Six Pakistan 
projects commit to information disclosure using websites to widely disseminate key project 
information, third-party evaluations, citizen monitoring reports on service delivery, status of 
evaluations, and complaints and actions taken. In Myanmar both the National community 
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driven development project and the Agricultural development support project  commit to 
having a dedicated section on project webpages to display project data such as supervision 
monitoring reports and the results of participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The 
Myanmar National Community Driven Development Project (NCDDP) makes use of the 
World Bank’s online operations portal to share pertinent project information, including 
project’s OM which is periodically updated to reflect project revisions based on learning from 
implementation. In the publicly available OM, the NCDDP documents all of the key project 
documents that will be disclosed, including but not limited to the findings of the financial, 
technical and social audits, and procurement documents. The project’s website, 
www.cdd.drdmyanmar.org, is the key place for disclosing project-related documents. In 
addition, documents are made publicly available in the participating communities, as feasible. 
Documents that should be disclosed and posted locally on notice boards are specified in the 
OM. 
 
The Water Services and Institutional Support II Project in Mozambique commits to using a 
web-based IBNET database to ensure transparency and accountability of collected survey 
information and to report impact evaluation results. In Nigeria, the Kaduna State Economic 
Transformation Program for-Results Project also commits to using its website for its public-
private partnership disclosure framework, project and budget information and audit results.  
 
The next two most commonly cited mechanisms for proactive information disclosure are 
publications and what projects term as ‘communication strategies’ (or plans). Of the 31 projects 
with a public disclosure commitment, four indicate the use of publications to disseminate 
information to the public. For example, in Mozambique, the Higher Education Science and 
Technology Project AF commits to disseminating the results of externally-led evaluations 
through live seminars and published summaries of the proceedings. The National Social 
Safety Nets project in Nigeria commits to an independent firm or CSO implementing and 
publishing an annual results and resources scorecard, and the Partnership for Education 
project in Nigeria pledges to disseminate publications and reviews related to education 
service delivery quality and project performance.  
 
Four projects commit to using a communication strategy for sharing project related 
information with the public. In Pakistan, the Sindh Barrages Improvement project commits to 
disseminating information on citizen engagement, feedback and safeguard related action 
plans via this strategy. Similarly, the Disaster and Climate Resilience Improvement project in 
Pakistan reports on developing a communications strategy to address the requirement for 
public consultation, participation and to inform the population about the availability of 
mechanisms such as a GRM. The Conservation Areas for Biodiversity and Development 
project in Mozambique also commits to developing a communication plan that includes 
ongoing communication channels to facilitate presentation of feedback and participatory 
monitoring. However, none of these projects specify the ways in which these communication 
strategies would reach the public.  
 
Three projects, one in Nigeria, one in Mozambique, and one in Myanmar commit to using 
real-time, in-person methods for disclosing project progress and results information to the 
public. In Nigeria, the Community and Social Development project AF2 commits to sharing 
project results by displaying them in a dedicated community space. In Mozambique and 
Myanmar, the Education Sector Support project AF and the National Community Driven 
Development project – AF commit to disseminating project results at sub-national and 
national workshops. Furthermore, the Education Sector Support project AF in Mozambique 
documented the planned period of time when the workshop would take place, lending 
specificity to its commitment that goes beyond other projects. Table 2.7 provides additional 
details. 
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Table 2.7 Examples of commitments to in-person project information disclosure 
Nigeria  Mozambique  Myanmar 
Community and Social 
Development project AF2 (FY16) 
Education Sector Support project 
AF (FY17) 
National Community Driven 
Development project – AF 
(FY15) 
Commitment: To disclose social 
accountability, public disclosure and 
complaints handling arrangements 
and project activities at an open 
space on a public board in the 
community. 
Commitment: To disclose and 
disseminate the results of the impact 
evaluation in a national workshop in 
April 2019 at the close of the project. 
 
Commitment: To organise multi-
stakeholder reviews (MSR) in 
each project township and 
subsequently at the union level, 
with all results then summarised 
and disseminated widely. 
What is being disclosed: 
Complaints mechanisms, project 
activities. 
What is being disclosed: Impact 
evaluation results. 
What is being disclosed: 
Results of sub-national and 
national multi-stakeholder 
reviews. 
How (mechanism): Public board in 
an open community space. 
How (mechanism): National 
workshop. 
How (mechanism): Sub-
national and national meetings, 
public boards in community 
spaces. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Finally, almost half of the projects (13 out of 31) that commit to proactive public information 
disclosure do not specify the mechanisms they would use. These include six projects in 
Pakistan, four in Nigeria, one in Myanmar and two in Mozambique. Table 2.8 shows four 
example projects, one from each country portfolio that do not specify how they will 
operationalise public information disclosure.  
 
Table 2.8 Examples of project commitments to proactive information disclosure 
without specific mechanisms  
Pakistan 
National Immunization 
Support (FY16) 
Nigeria 
Program to Support 
Saving One Million Lives 
(FY15) 
Myanmar 
Essential Health 
Services Access 
Project (FY15) 
Mozambique 
Social Protection Project 
AF (FY17) 
Commitment: Improving 
Expanded Program on 
Immunization (EPI) 
functionality to enable 
regular dissemination of 
results to public and 
media.  
Commitment: Conducting 
surveys, verifying and 
disseminating the results 
of a standardised M&E 
survey. 
 
Commitment: The 
Ministry of Health (MOH) 
will disseminate 
township health plans to 
township stakeholders 
and communities. 
Commitment: Information 
on programme outcomes 
drawn from a multiyear 
third-party impact 
evaluation has been 
disseminated publicly. 
What is being 
Disclosed: Project 
results. 
What is being Disclosed: 
M&E survey results. 
What is being 
Disclosed: Township 
health plans. 
What is being Disclosed: 
Third-party impact 
evaluation. 
How (Mechanism): 
None. 
How (Mechanism): None. How (Mechanism):     
None. 
How (Mechanism): None. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Box 2.2 Public disclosure of CE activities and results as mitigating measures for 
potential conflict 
The Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project (MSCRP) for North Eastern Nigeria (FY17) 
showcases citizen engagement activities (including GRM and two-way dialogue) in concert 
with plans for ‘full and frequent’ dissemination of results as one of the ways the project will 
mitigate conflicts that could arise due to project activities.  
  
Project activities Potential and associated 
impacts 
Mitigation measures 
Direct or indirect impacts on 
conditions in the North East. 
Social unrest, potential conflict 
with local communities, 
disruption of work, and risks to 
personnel because of the history 
of conflict.  
Maintain effective two-way 
dialogue through transparency 
and disclosure, full and frequent 
information to the public and 
concerned NGOs, and establish 
arrangement for community 
liaison and for handling 
complaints and grievances.  
See: World Bank (2017b: 88). 
 
Given the importance of public access to accurate and timely project implementation 
information for fostering a conducive environment for CE, the ARC investigation examined 
whether and how projects planned to disclose information about the World Bank prioritised 
CE activities or other enabling environment indicators. Significant for each of these areas, 
public disclosure has particular value for results collected by entities external to, and 
potentially independent from, project management. ARC’s guiding hypothesis is that in 
projects where third-party monitoring results are made public, this helps to advance a 
conducive or enabling environment by encouraging public accountability and transparency in 
project operations. As a result, these two areas are complementary and mutually reinforcing 
in creating an enabling environment for citizen engagement.  
 
This research therefore further delves into the intersection of third-party monitoring of CE 
activities and proactive disclosure commitments within projects across the four country 
portfolios and Figure 2.19 depicts the relationship between the two.  
 
Figure 2.19 Overlapping project commitments to third-party monitoring for CE and 
public disclosure, four country total 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Within the small minority of 16 projects across the four countries that commit to third-party 
monitoring of citizen engagement activities, ten also include commitments to proactive 
disclosure. However, an exploration of the content of project commitments revealed that this 
overlap of enabling environment commitments did not necessarily mean that the results of 
third-party monitoring would be included in the information disclosed to the public. Among 
these ten projects only five specified that they would disclose results from third-party 
monitoring. These five projects include one each from Pakistan, Myanmar and Mozambique 
and two projects from Nigeria. Table 2.9 provides details about what these projects commit 
to monitoring and sharing publicly. 
 
Table 2.9 Project commitments to third-party monitoring and public disclosure of 
results 
Project title Commitments to third-party 
monitoring (CE) 
Commitments to proactive 
information disclosure  
Punjab Skills 
Development project 
(FY15) – Pakistan 
 
Specific third-party independent 
monitoring activities will be carried out to 
verify employer satisfaction surveys, 
third-party validations of enrolment and 
pass-out data, employment tracer 
studies, monitoring of training providers. 
The project website will be used to 
widely disseminate information, and 
third-party evaluations to public and 
interested stakeholders.  
National Community 
Driven Development 
project (FY15) –  
Myanmar 
 
Independent third party will act as a 
check on social accountability 
mechanisms and CE specifically relating 
to participation, role of women and OVGs 
in project decision-making, 
implementation and effectiveness of 
GRM. 
Lessons learned from independent third-
party monitoring will be shared with a 
broad set of stakeholders, including 
Department for Rural Development, the 
World Bank and civil society observers.  
Social Protection 
project AF (FY17) – 
Mozambique 
Verification of the beneficiaries’ 
participation by third party, impact 
evaluation including on issues related to 
CE. 
Information on programme outcomes 
from a multi-year third-party impact 
evaluation has been disseminated 
publicly. 
National Social Safety 
Nets project (FY16) – 
Nigeria 
Independent third-party monitors (i.e. 
CSOs and specialised private firms) will 
collect feedback from beneficiaries on 
project performance (e.g. transfers, 
quality of services and responsiveness to 
beneficiary challenges) and conduct spot 
checks.  
Commitment to publishing ‘annual results 
and resources scorecard’, which will be 
produced by a third-party organisation.    
Nigeria Youth 
Employment and 
Social Support AF 
(FY16)  
Third party to collect feedback from 
communities and beneficiaries on their 
experiences. 
 
Third-party monitors will disclose annual 
results of resources scorecard.  
 
This analysis points to several key take-aways. Of the three enabling environment indicators 
studied, proactive information disclosure represents the area with the fewest commitments. 
Twenty-six projects across the four countries (45 per cent) make no commitments to 
proactively disclosing information about project progress, monitoring results or outcomes. 
Across the 31 projects that do commit to public information disclosure, most commonly say 
they will do so by using project websites, followed by publications and communication 
strategies. Yet, even among those projects that include this commitment, their project 
documents reveal few specifics about exactly what the public should expect to find out and 
how often the information will be made available. Furthermore, in most projects the 
information disclosed to the public will neither come from external monitors nor will be related 
to citizen engagement findings and results. Therefore, even among those projects that 
include commitments to ‘reporting out’ progress and/or results to the public, the ambiguity of 
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these commitments means that it remains unclear how robust or meaningful the limited 
information that reaches the public will ultimately be on operations whose implementation 
directly affects them.  
 
Box 2.3 Lessons learned from monitoring how CE commitments are carried out in 
Myanmar 
ARC’s pilot implementation research in Myanmar was conducted over the course of a year 
(September 2017–September 2018). The fieldwork focused on three projects: The 
Ayeyarwady Integrated River Basin Management Project (FY15), Essential Health 
Services Access (FY15), and the National Community Driven Development Project 
(NCDDP) (FY15). The empirical findings are still being analysed, but preliminarily suggest 
the following five lessons for independent monitoring of government programmes funded 
by the World Bank. 
1. The public release of the project OM matters for accountability and empowerment. 
This is not just an administrative document, but serves as the blue print for how the 
project will be translated into action on the ground.   
2.    When GRMs are actually being carried out they may not only be used to convey 
complaints. Project affected peoples are taking the opportunity to submit general 
feedback, including praise and gratitude. While this expanded function for GRMs has 
benefits because it can represent the opening of new avenues for government–
citizen communication, it also can mean that actual grievances are not adequately 
addressed or are overlooked entirely. 
3.  The civic space that project CE efforts are opening is relatively ephemeral. It may 
disappear when projects end. Yet, when a space opens that had not previously 
existed this small amount of freedom of association is a possible step towards 
collective action. 
4.  CE in many cases continues to be an unfunded mandate. This negatively affects 
both how commitments are carried out and how community members can participate 
in CE opportunities when offered.  
5. Citizens do not view all projects equally. From a citizen perspective, there can be a 
significant difference between projects that are national programmes which receive 
World Bank funding versus stand-alone projects that appear to only exist because of 
World Bank financing. The differences in perception have implications for monitoring 
that are not yet fully understood. 
 
  
3 The findings and their implications   
What does this assessment reveal about the degree to which the World Bank is (or is not) 
embedding opportunities for citizen engagement in its project design? What are the 
implications of these findings, if any, for citizens in FCVAS, in terms of their possible 
empowerment, and for government accountability to their citizens? Section 3.1 answers the 
first question, presenting the assessment’s main technical findings and discussing what the 
results from these four countries reveal about how the World Bank is building the new 
institutional CE commitments into project design. Section 3.2 addresses the second 
question, using the country-specific findings to critically appraise how the World Bank’s 
approach to CE appears to be (or not to be) contributing to E&A in FCVAS.  
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3.1 Synthesis of technical findings 
The in-depth analysis of CE in FY15–17 World Bank projects in Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan that has been laid out in the sections above leads to the following key 
findings: 
 
The ARC CE density scale reveals that a narrow majority of the projects commits to ‘thick’ 
approaches to citizen engagement while a sizeable minority commits to thin approaches. As 
explained in the 2018 IEG evaluation: ‘“Thick” approaches — those combining multiple tools 
to enable collective action and public sector responsiveness — are more promising than 
“thin” approaches — those that are not matched with vertical integration of independent 
monitoring and oversight or do not include support to increase government’s capacity to 
respond’ (World Bank 2018c: xiii). Fifty-seven per cent of the 57 projects (32) incorporated a 
wide range of CE and enabling environment mechanisms into project design, therefore 
demonstrating thick approaches to CE. These 32 projects were spread among the two top 
categories of the CE density scale: robust (47 per cent or 25 projects) and comprehensive 
(16 per cent or 7 projects). In contrast, the assessment found that the other 43 per cent only 
commit to using a limited number of CE activities that will not necessarily be matched with 
mechanisms to foster an enabling environment for CE. These ranked on the CE density 
scale as: intermediate (27 per cent or 14 projects), weak (11 per cent or 6 projects), and low 
(6 per cent or 3 projects).  
 
At the country-level, Nigeria and Mozambique showcase substantially higher CE density 
results than Pakistan and Myanmar. The application of the ARC CE density scale showed 
that in Nigeria and Mozambique, at least 65 per cent of each country’s projects rank in the 
top two categories (with slightly above 50 per cent in the ‘robust’ category). Furthermore, in 
Mozambique no projects are classified as low. In Pakistan, the largest country portfolio, only 
23 per cent of total projects achieved a robust category ranking, the same percentage of 
projects that occupy the bottom two categories, weak and low.  
 
Of the four countries studied, the Nigeria portfolio most consistently committed to CE 
throughout project life cycles, with 75 per cent committing to include at least six of the seven 
World Bank prioritised CE activities and at least two of the three ARC identified indicators. 
Furthermore, the portfolio demonstrated increased adoption of the CE agenda over time, 
given that the projects with the weakest CE commitments were approved in FY15, the first 
year of the CE strategy’s application. The consistency of thick approaches to CE throughout 
the Nigeria portfolio and increased uptake of the CE agenda over time, potentially indicates 
that there was country-level leadership prioritising systematic incorporation of CE into project 
design.  
 
Citizen consultation during project preparation and GRMs (both 91 per cent) are the CE 
areas to which projects most commonly commit while citizen involvement in project 
monitoring has the fewest commitments (50 per cent). Both sets of findings align with the 
2018 IEG evaluation results (World Bank 2018c). Commitments to gathering citizen feedback 
during implementation is the second most common CE mechanism that projects incorporate 
(85 per cent). While capacity building for CE is ahead of citizen monitoring; only slightly 
above 50 per cent of projects across the four countries commit to undertaking activities 
intended to build capacity building for community members or government that would 
strengthen citizen engagement.  
 
There is a significant gap between the CE mechanisms most commonly incorporated into 
project design and those which projects commit to measuring. Although 91 per cent of 
projects commit to carrying out a GRM, only 23 per cent of those commit to reporting on the 
results. This aligns with the IEG evaluation which reported that GRMs were the most 
common mechanisms included in project design but the least measured. The least measured 
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area in this four country sample, however, was citizen involvement in M&E which had no CE 
indicators across any of the 57 projects studied.  
 
Despite the fact that 85 per cent of projects explicitly make commitments to collecting citizen 
feedback during implementation, few projects state how that data would be used, if at all. 
Furthermore, there is extreme variation in how projects document the types of feedback to be 
collected, the mechanisms to be used, and the level of detail explaining how the 
commitments will be executed. Even though citizen feedback collection is the area that will 
be most frequently reported on across the four countries (28 projects), the kinds of indicators 
used (i.e. percentage of beneficiaries satisfied with the service provided) do not show how 
the results could potentially be used to improve implementation.  Country examples 
demonstrate how ticking the check box for this category of CE might not guarantee that the 
commitment is either adequate to gather feedback from communities in a way that could 
meaningfully contribute to the project or that the feedback would be used to inform 
implementation choices 
 
Project commitment across all four countries to adopting measures for proactive social 
inclusion in citizen engagement processes is extremely high (90 per cent). These 
commitments focus almost entirely on women and infrequently on other socially excluded 
groups. The findings show that considering proactive social inclusion broadly as an indicator 
of an enabling environment for CE is too ambiguous. A deeper exploration shows that an 
overwhelming number of projects commit only to gender-related inclusion measures, which, 
while extremely important, mean that there is minimal attention to ensuring that other socially 
excluded groups (e.g. the disabled, youth, internally displaced, and ethnic minorities) will 
have a voice in project-facilitated engagement.  
 
Proactive information disclosure has significantly fewer commitments than proactive social 
inclusion and third-party monitoring. Even among those projects that include this 
commitment, few specify what information will be proactively disclosed, and how often. In 
most projects that do commit to proactive information disclosure, the data will neither come 
from external monitors nor will cover citizen engagement-related findings and results. 
Therefore, even among those projects that include commitments to sharing progress and/or 
results with the public, there is ambiguity over how robust or meaningful the limited public 
information will be. 
 
There is a much greater emphasis on ‘reporting up’ to World Bank management rather than 
‘reporting out’ to the public. This bias is demonstrated most clearly by the discrepancy 
between project commitments to third-party monitoring and proactive information disclosure.  
While 87 per cent of projects commit to using external monitoring at least once during project 
implementation to gather data that will be reported to the World Bank (and potentially 
government counterparts), only 54 per cent of projects commit to proactively sharing any 
project information with the public. Furthermore, only a small portion of proactive disclosure 
commitments relate to data produced by third-party monitors. Therefore, while the third-party 
monitoring results demonstrate that the World Bank prioritises investment in externally 
produced data about project performance for internal monitoring and evaluation, the 
proactive information disclosure results show that it does not recognise the importance of 
public access to this information. 
  
Few projects, including those that document CE commitments across all areas, provide 
specifics on how they plan to carry out the engagement. Therefore the ‘thickness’ found in 
terms of numbers of CE commitments mostly does not translate to ‘thickness’ in terms of 
their specificity. Project examples from across the four countries assessed demonstrate how 
‘ticking the box’ for a CE activity does not guarantee that the commitment will be fulfilled in a 
way that meaningfully contributes to the project. Furthermore, although a majority of projects 
commit to reporting on an aspect of CE, investigating the content of project monitoring 
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indicators on CE shows that the limited information captured (e.g. GRM: percentage of 
complaints addressed but without data on the number of complaints received or their nature 
and their resolution) is not sufficient to inform the public about the nature and impact of 
citizen involvement.  
 
Each country portfolio includes at least one project whose design models both a high density 
of CE commitments as well as a high specificity in CE plans and measures to create an 
enabling environment for citizen action. These include: Mozambique: the Conservation Areas 
for Biodiversity and Development project and Additional Financing for Social Protection 
project; Myanmar: the National Community Driven Development project; Nigeria: the Kaduna 
State Economic Transformation Program-for-Results project and Multi-Sectoral Crisis 
Recovery project for North Eastern Nigeria; and Pakistan: the Immunization and Support 
project. Although this conclusion is based only on CE integration into design and not 
evidence from actual implementation, these projects still show that the World Bank is 
capable of more systematically planning for and committing to reporting on citizen 
engagement.  
 
3.2 The World Bank’s CE agenda: implications for empowerment and 
accountability? 
What does this research and its findings tell advocates, practitioners and scholars about how 
the World Bank’s model of project-induced citizen action can contribute to empowerment and 
accountability outcomes and processes in FCVAS? The answer to this ‘so what?’ question 
depends on three broader questions:  
 
1. Do World Bank projects, which are co-designed with governments, make policy 
commitments that – if implemented – would change the institutional environment that 
shapes power relations between governments and the governed?  
 
This question – the main focus of this study – is necessary but not sufficient to answer the 
next question. 
 
2. To what degree are those policy commitments actually implemented in practice?  
 
Answering this question would involve a much larger-scale study, with extensive field 
research to document continuity and change in patterns of state-society interaction in dozens 
of project areas of influence. Instead, this study carried out pilot field research on project 
implementation in Myanmar, which sheds light on how relevant – and ambitious – such a 
research agenda would be. This independent review of policy commitments therefore is 
intended to serve as an input to inform such important future research. 
 
3. Even if World Bank project commitments to opening civic space are serious, and even 
if those commitments are actually implemented in practice – the question remains - 
would they have spillover effects? Would they survive beyond the involvement of the 
external donor? 
  
The broader development literature on external donor-funded projects raises questions about 
whether and how they have multiplier effects – positive or negative – beyond those projects’ 
area of influence and timeframe. This primarily desk review-based study addresses just the 
first link in this much longer causal chain. 
 
In this context and within these parameters, this research on CE in World Bank project 
design in select FCV countries offers several relevant insights about the potential 
achievement of E&A: 
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 There is a wide spectrum of how World Bank projects document their intentions for 
opening spaces and opportunities for citizen engagement, and more projects commit to 
using thick approaches that include a variety of mechanisms than those that rely on 
thin approaches. While this is promising, documented commitments to thick 
approaches are not a guarantee that they will be carried out in practice. However, the 
likelihood and the opportunity for meaningful CE that could lead to empowerment and 
accountability outcomes increases substantially when plans are more deeply 
embedded in design. 
 At the same time, the general way that so many projects describe their CE plans, even 
those projects with a high number of commitments, creates concerns about whether 
and how they will provide meaningful opportunities for input and engagement or if they 
will be perfunctory and ‘tick box’. If the latter, they are unlikely to reach E&A goals.  
 The significant discrepancies between commitments to implementing CE mechanisms 
and publicly disclosing results is a threat to achieving accountability outcomes. This is 
exemplified with best project commitments to GRMs and third-party monitoring, which 
are two key mechanisms through which projects can increase their accountability to the 
public. 
o All but six of the assessed projects committed to creating a GRM during 
implementation and only nine projects lacked any commitments to third-party 
monitoring. Yet the vast majority of these projects have no commitments to 
disclosing the results. Even those projects that do commit to some kind of 
reporting, most commonly through monitoring indicators, frame the information to 
be gathered and reported extremely narrowly.  
o In regard to GRMs, this means that those directly or indirectly affected by these 
World Bank projects are unlikely to ever have access to information about the 
kinds of complaints submitted, or if or how they are being resolved. Regarding 
third-party monitoring, even if external monitors do maintain independence from 
project implementers and their monitoring results reflect this, without transparent 
access to these results, they lose their value as accountability tools for the public.   
 The lack of documented plans to integrate other socially excluded groups raises the 
concern that even if a project achieves E&A outcomes, they will be exclusionary and 
will not reach populations that have the most significant need.   
 In contrast to the well documented commitments to creating space for citizen voice, 
there is little to nothing documented about how the results of CE activities will feed 
back into and inform project. The CE Strategy emphasises the feedback loop 
component of citizen engagement, but the vast majority of projects assessed do not 
document how they plan to close the loop. This leaves significant questions about how 
the World Bank’s induced citizen action will actually make contributions to development 
outcomes overall, and E&A outcomes in particular.  
 Finally, because of the project-specific nature of the documented CE mechanisms, 
these findings shed light primarily on how the World Bank is realising its institutional CE 
agenda and little on how the state commits to engaging its citizens beyond what a finite 
World Bank project requires.  
 
Research on design means that the findings are by nature speculative and cannot guarantee 
what will or will not take place in practice. The guiding assumption in this work is that 
specificity in commitments means that they will be more likely to be carried out as described. 
However, this is not guaranteed to happen. In the same vein, where the research identified 
significant gaps in CE in project design this should be seen as a warning, but not be taken as 
a predictor of whether citizen engagement objectives will or will not be met.   
 
Therefore, this product is not an end in and of itself, but it is a significant input that helps 
make possible the eventual answering of the overarching A4EA questions. Carrying out an 
ambitious plan that alters the way business has long been done should be expected to be 
uneven and challenging. Mapping of commitments to CE therefore reveals a landscape of 
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potentially contested terrain and with this knowledge advocates can be prepared. The next 
critical step then, is to use this design-based mapping, this analysing of CE commitments, as 
a driver of advocacy efforts to promote CE and as the basis of an investigation into how CE 
is being carried out in practice. 
 
There is real potential for the World Bank’s new CE agenda to make an impact in FCVAS. 
The narrow civic spaces created by World Bank funded projects in these settings could be 
potentially significant. Even with the noted limitations, invited or induced spaces for citizen 
engagement can potentially be broadened when social actors take advantage of openings 
from above to exercise associational autonomy (Fox 2004). In fact, if all of the projects that 
qualified as robust on the CE density scale across these four FCV countries accomplished 
even 75 per cent of the citizen engagement efforts integrated in their design, this would have 
a significant impact on the enabling environment for empowerment and accountability. 
Furthermore, the World Bank’s current approach to governance reform potentially can make 
the CE strategy more effective if it bolsters enabling environments for citizen voice by, for 
example, funding ombudsman agencies, audit bureaus, public information agencies, 
independent judicial systems, and human rights commissions.  
 
If the World Bank moves beyond policy pronouncements and uses its institutional clout with 
partner governments to leverage the citizen engagement it induces within its projects, the 
institution, in principle, could move towards opening new civic spaces as well as 
strengthening existing civic space. This study on project design cannot definitively determine 
whether or not the World Bank is accomplishing this. However, these findings that cover 
three years and four countries help to make it possible to answer this critical question, laying 
the ground work for the next initiative that would investigate how these World Bank 
operations are realising their documented commitments in practice.   
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Annexe: Citizen engagement overview tables   
 
 
Myanmar projects  
(FY15–17) 
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National Community 
Driven Development 
(FY15) 
400 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Essential Health Services 
Access (FY15) 
100 IP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Agricultural Development 
Support (FY15) 
100 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Flood and Landslide 
Emergency Recovery 
(FY17) 
200 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 2 
National Electrification 
(FY16) 
400 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 5 2 
Ayeyarwady Integrated 
River Basin Management 
(FY15) 
100 IP+IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No 5 1 
Southeast Asia Disaster 
Risk Management (FY17) 
130 IR Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No 5 1 
Financial Sector 
Development (FY17) 
100 None No No No No No No Yes No No No 1 0 
Total commitments  7 7 7 7 5 7 4 7 7 5 3   
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Mozambique projects 
(FY15–17) 
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Conservation Areas for 
Biodiversity and 
Development Project 
(FY15) 
40 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Social Protection 
Project AF (FY17) 
10 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Forest Investment 
Project (FY17) 
15 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 2 
Agriculture and Natural 
Resources Landscape 
(FY16) 
40 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 2 
AF to Education Sector 
Support Project (FY17) 
59 Yes Yes Yes No  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 6 3 
Water Services and 
Institutional Support II 
(FY16) 
90 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
AF to Education Sector 
Support Project (FY16) 
50 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 2 
Emergency Resilient 
Recovery Project 
(FY16) 
40 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 5 1 
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AF Emergency Resilient 
Recovery Project 
(FY17) 
20 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 5 0 
Higher Education 
Science and 
Technology Project AF 
(FY15) 
45 No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes 3 2 
The Cities and Climate 
Change Project/Pilot 
Program for Climate 
Resilience of 
Mozambique (FY15) 
15.75 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 3 1 
Total commitments  10 11 9 6 7 10 9 10 9 8 6   
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Nigeria projects   
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Kaduna State Economic 
Transformation Program-for-
Results (FY17) 
350 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery 
Project for North Eastern 
Nigeria (FY17) 
200 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
State Education Program 
Investment AF (FY16) 
100 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 2 
Third National Fadama 
Development Project AF 2 
(FY16) 
50 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 7 2 
Mineral Sector Support for 
Economic Diversification 
(FY17) 
150 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    No 7 2 
National Social Safety Nets AF 
(FY16) 
500 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
Community and Social 
Development AF 2 (FY16) 
75 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
Partnership for Education 
(FY15) 
100 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
Youth Employment and Social 
Support AF (FY16) 
100 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
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Nigeria projects   
(FY15–17) 
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Agro-Processing, Productivity 
Enhancement Livelihood 
Improvement Support (FY17) 
200 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 2 
Better Education Service 
Delivery for All (FY17) 
611 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 5 2 
State Health Investment Project 
AF (FY16) 
125 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 5 1 
Development Finance (FY15) 500 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No 4 2 
Program to Support Saving 
One Million Lives (FY15) 
500 No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 3 2 
AF Polio Eradication Support 
(FY16) 
125 No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes No 2 1 
Polio Eradication Support AF 
(FY15) 
200 No Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No 1 2 
Total commitments   6 14 12 14 12 14 7 12 12 16 8   
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Pakistan projects (FY15–17) 
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National Immunization Support 
(FY16) 
144 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Sindh Public Sector Management 
Reform  (FY15) 
50 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 3 
Sindh Water Sector Improvement 
Phase 1 AF (FY15) 
138 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 2 
Balochistan Integrated Water 
Resources Management and 
Development (FY16) 
200 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
Third Punjab Education Sector  
(FY16) 
300 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
National Social Protection 
Program for Results (FY17) 
100 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 3 
Sindh Irrigated Agriculture 
Productivity Enhancement  (FY15) 
187 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 2 
Sindh Agricultural Growth (FY15) 76 Yes Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 6 2 
Karachi Neighborhood 
Improvement (FY17) 
86 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 6 2 
Enhanced Nutrition for Mothers 
and Children (FY15) 
36 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 5 3 
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Pakistan projects (FY15–17) 
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FATA Temporarily Displaced 
Persons Emergency Recovery 
(FY16) 
75  
No 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 3 
Tarbela 4th Extension 
Hydropower AF (FY17) 
390 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 5 2 
Punjab Tourism for Economic 
Growth (FY17) 
50 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 5 2 
Sindh Barrages Improvement 
(FY15) 
50 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 3 
Disaster and Climate Resilience 
Improvement (FY15) 
125 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 4 3 
Sindh Resilience FY16 100 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 3 
Economic Revitalization of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas AF (FY17) 
19 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 4 2 
Governance and Policy Program 
Balochistan (FY16) 
19 No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 4 2 
Sindh Enhancing Response to 
Reduce Stunting (FY17) 
62 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No     Yes No No 4 1 
Punjab Skills Development  (FY15) 50 No Yes No Yes No Yes No  No    Yes Yes Yes 3 3 
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Pakistan projects (FY15–17) 
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GPE Balochistan Education 
Project (FY15)  
34 No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes  Yes    Yes 2 3 
Pakistan Financial Inclusion and 
Infrastructure (FY17) 
137 No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No    Yes 2 2 
Total commitments  10 20 12 22 6 21 11 16 22 19 14   
 68 
 
References 
Bebbington, A.; Woolcock, M.; Guggenheim, S. and Olson, E. (2006) The Search for 
Empowerment: Social Capital as Idea and Practice at The World Bank, Hartford: 
Kumarian 
 
Davis, G. (2004) A History of the Social Development Network in The World Bank, 1973–
2003, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series 56, Washington DC: World Bank, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/806361468779696310/A-history-of-the-
social-development-network-in-The-World-Bank-1973-2002 (accessed 3 April 2019) 
 
Fox, J. (2015) ‘Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?’, World  
Development 72: 346–61 
 
Fox, J. (2004) ‘Empowerment and Institutional Change: Mapping “Virtuous Circles” of State-
Society Interaction’, in R. Alsop (ed.), Power, Rights and Poverty: Concepts and 
Connections, Washington DC: World Bank/Department for International Development 
 
Fox, J. and Brown, L.D. (eds) (1998) The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, 
NGOs and Grassroots Movements, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
 
Gugerty, M.K. and Kremer, M. (2008) ‘Outside Funding and the Dynamics of Participation in  
Community Associations’, American Journal of Political Science 52.3: 585–602 
 
Haque, M.S. (2008) ‘Decentering the State for Local Accountability through Representation: 
Social Divides as a Barrier in South Asia’, Public Administration Quarterly 32.1: 33–58 
 
Kim, J. (2013) ‘One Group, Two Goals: Our Future Path’, Keynote speech presented at the 
World Bank Group Annual Meetings Plenary, 11 October, Washington DC, 
www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2013/10/11/world-bank-group-president-jim-
yong-kim-speech-annual-meetings-plenary (accessed 27 June 2018) 
 
Le, H.; Nadelman, R.; Sah, A. and Evans, I. (2019) World Bank Operationalization of Citizen 
Engagement in Project Design: A Pilot Assessment of the Mozambique Portfolio 
FY15–17, Washington DC: Accountability Research Center 
 
Manroth, A. et al. (2014) Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in 
World Bank Group Operations: Engaging with Citizens for Improved Results, 
Washington DC: World Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ 
en/266371468124780089/Strategic-framework-for-mainstreaming-citizen-
engagement-in-World-Bank-Group-operations-engaging-with-citizens-for-improved-
results (accessed 27 June 2018) 
 
Mansuri, G. and Rao, V. (2013) Localizing Development: Does Participation Work? Policy 
Research Report, Washington DC: World Bank 
Nadelman, R.; Le, H. and Sah, A. (2019) World Bank Operationalization of Citizen 
Engagement in Project Design: A Pilot Assessment of the Nigeria Portfolio FY15–17, 
Washington DC: Accountability Research Center 
 
Nadelman, R.; Htun, W.; Le, H. and Sah, A. (2019) World Bank Operationalization of Citizen 
Engagement in Project Design and Implementation: A Pilot Assessment in Myanmar, 
Washington DC: Accountability Research Center 
 
Plummer, J. (2018) ‘ECA Citizen Engagement Quality Index’, presentation to the July 
Meeting of World Bank-CSO Working Group, 13 June 2018, Washington DC 
 69 
 
 
Sah, A. and Nadelman, R. (2019) World Bank Operationalization of Citizen Engagement in 
Project Design: A Pilot Assessment of the Pakistan Portfolio, Washington DC: 
Accountability Research Center 
 
Van Wicklin III, W.A. and Gurkan, A. (2013) How-to Notes: Participatory and Third Party 
Monitoring in World Bank Projects - What Can Non-State Actors Do?, Governance 
and Anti-Corruption (GAC) in Projects: Dealing with Governance and Corruption 
Risks in Project Lending, Washington DC: World Bank, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/863281468337280255/How-to-notes-
participatory-and-third-party-monitoring-in-World-Bank-projects-what-can-non-state-
actors-do (accessed 15 November 2018) 
 
Weaver, C. (2008) Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank the Poverty of Reform, Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press 
 
World Bank (2019) Environment and Social Framework, www.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/environmental-and-social-framework (accessed 31 January 2019) 
 
World Bank (2018a) Citizen Engagement, www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-
do/brief/citizen-engagement (accessed 27 June 2018) 
 
World Bank (2018b) Community-Driven Development Overview, www.worldbank.org/en/ 
topic/communitydrivendevelopment#2 (accessed 17 September 2018) 
 
World Bank (2018c) Engaging Citizens for Better Development, Independent Evaluation 
Group, Washington DC: World Bank, https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/ 
files/Data/Evaluation/files/Engaging_Citizens_for_Better_Development_Results_Full
Report.pdf (accessed 27 June 2018) 
 
World Bank (2018d) Products and Services, www.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/products-and-services (accessed 10 September 2018) 
 
World Bank (2017a) Annual Report 2017: World Bank Lending (Fiscal 2017), Washington 
DC: World Bank, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/982201506096253267/AR17-
World-Bank-Lending.pdf (accessed 15 December 2018) 
 
World Bank (2017b) Nigeria Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project, Washington DC: World 
Bank Group (Project Appraisal Document/PAD), http://documents.worldbank.org/ 
curated/en/720891490278540329/Nigeria-Multi-Sectoral-Crisis-Recovery-Project 
(accessed 27 November 2018)  
 
World Bank (2012) Program-for-Results Financing Overview, Washington DC: World Bank 
Group, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/654421478722080104/PforR-Overview-
Presentation-OPCS.pdf (accessed 31 January 2019) 
 
World Bank (2007) Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and 
Anticorruption, Washington DC: World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/GACStrategyPaper.pdf (accessed 
15 November 2018) 
 
World Bank (2005) Empowering People by Transforming Institutions: Social Development in 
World Bank Operations, Washington DC: World Bank, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-
1164181732580/SDStrategy-Full.pdf (accessed 15 November 2018) 
 
